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"COMPARATIVE REPREHENSIBILITY" AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Yale Kamisar*
It is not . . . easy to see what the shock-the-conscience test adds, or
should be allowed to add, to the deterrent function of exclusionary rules.
Where no deterrence of unconstitutional police behavior is possible, a
decision to exclude probative evidence with the result that a criminal
goes free to prey upon the public should shock the judicial conscience
even more than admitting the evidence.
So spoke Judge Robert H. Bork, concurring in a ruling that the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to foreign
searches conducted exclusively by foreign officials.1 A short time
thereafter, when an interviewer read back the above statement and in-
vited him to comment further on the subject, Judge Bork responded:
[One of the reasons] sometimes given [in support of the exclusionary
rule] is that courts shouldn't soil their hands by allowing in unconstitu-
tionally acquired evidence. I have never been convinced by that argu-
* Henry K. Ransom Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1950, New York Uni-
versity; LL.B. 1954, Columbia University. - Ed.
In writing this article I profited from conversations with Albert Alschuler, Tom Davies, Jerry
Israel, Wayne LaFave, Myron Orfield, Fred Schauer, Herman Schwartz, and Peter Westen.
1. United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Judge Bork wrote sepa-
rately to address "more directly" Mount's alternative argument that a federal court should use
its "supervisory power" over the administration of federal criminal justice to exclude evidence
"in cases where foreign law enforcement authorities secure evidence by means which 'shock the
judicial conscience.'" 757 F.2d at 1320. Bork regarded United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727
(1980) (even where government's violation of a third party's rights is "purposefully illegal," the
supervisory power "does not authorize" a federal court to exclude evidence that was not obtained
in violation of defendant's fourth amendment rights) as a more appealing case for applying an
exclusionary rule than a case where foreign officials have engaged in misconduct, 757 F.2d at
1322, and he maintained that in light of Payner "we clearly lack supervisory power to create any
exclusionary rule that expands the rule the Supreme Court has created under the Fourth Amend-
ment," 757 F.2d at 1320. I believe that Payner is a most unfortunate decision, see Kamisar, Does
(Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical
Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 636-38 (1983), but I read that case the same way
Judge Bork does.
Judge Bork then went on to say that even if a federal court "had the power sometimes to
exclude evidence obtained through illegal foreign searches," he "would still disagree" with the
case law and the suggestion in the Mount majority opinion that, in the exercise of its supervisory
power, a federal court should adopt "a shock-the-conscience test to determine what evidence is to
be excluded." 757 F.2d at 1323 & n.6. It was in this setting that Judge Bork made the observa-
tion quoted in the text. For a long, hard look at the federal supervisory power generally, see
Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits
on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984).
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ment because it seems the conscience of the court ought to be at least
equally shaken by the idea of turning a criminal loose upon society.2
Judge Bork displays no affection for the exclusionary rule, but he
may not be making an affirmative case against it. All he may be saying
is that whatever good reasons may exist for excluding illegally seized
evidence, the "judges shouldn't soil their hands" argument isn't one of
them.3 On the other hand, Bork may be implying something more -
or at least a reader may understandably infer something more: Where
the defendant's conduct is more reprehensible than the police officer's
(as, of course, it usually will be), the "judges shouldn't soil their
hands" argument is a good reason for admitting illegally seized evi-
dence. For "judges soil their hands" a good deal more by "turning a
criminal loose upon society" than they do by simply ignoring an of-
ficer's violation of the fourth amendment. To put it somewhat differ-
ently, if the admissibility of illegally seized evidence turns solely on
how the ruling affects the judge's "conscience," the defendant's mo-
tion to suppress should almost always fail. For a judge ought to lose a
lot less sleep over admitting highly probative, albeit tainted, evidence
than she should over "freeing" an apparently guilty person to "prey
upon society" again.
I. VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR TAKING A "COMPARATIVE
REPREHENSIBILITY" APPROACH TO THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The course of action suggested by Judge Bork, or at least an idea
lurking in his comments - what I shall call the "comparative repre-
hensibility" approach to the admissibility of unconstitutionally seized,
but reliable evidence - can take various forms:
(a) since "turning a criminal loose" is always more shocking, or at
least as shocking, as admitting relevant and reliable, albeit illegally ac-
2. McGuigan, An Interview with Judge Robert H. Bork, JUD. NoTICE, June 1986, at 1, 6.
3. One of the witnesses who supported Judge Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court, Mr.
Dewey Stokes, National President of the Fraternal Order of Police, did Bork a disservice, I
believe, by leaving out the last six words of the statement quoted in the text at note 1, thus
altering the judge's meaning. "In Judge Bork's own words," Mr. Stokes told the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, "'Where no deterrence of unconstitutional police behavior is possible, a decision
to exclude probative evidence with the result that a criminal goes free to prey upon the public
should shock the judicial conscience ....... Statement of the Fraternal Order of Police before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to the Supreme Court of the
United States, Sept. 22, 1987, pp. 8-9 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). By omitting the
last portion of Judge Bork's statement, the witness failed to indicate that Bork was responding to
a "judges shouldn't soil their hands" argument and made it appear that excluding unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence, when such a ruling would have no deterrent effect, struck Bork as
"shocking" in the abstract.
[Vol. 86:1
"Comparative Reprehensibility"
quired, evidence, unless there are other good reasons for not doing so, a
court should always admit such evidence;
(b) in ruling on the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment, a court should balance the seriousness of the of-
ficer's error against the gravity of the defendant's crime and only exclude
the evidence when, if ever, the reprehensibility of the officer's illegality is
greater than the defendant's;
(c) the courts should consider some crimes, e.g., murder, rape, and
armed robbery, so serious that their gravity will always exceed the grav-
ity of any unreasonable search or seizure and completely eliminate these
crimes from the coverage of the rule, but apply the rule as it normally
would be in all remaining cases;4
(d) in applying the "comparative reprehensibility" test, a court
might take a two-level approach, (i) never excluding illegally seized evi-
dence in the "most serious" cases (because the defendant's conduct in
such cases will always be more reprehensible than the police officer's),
and (ii) freely balancing the graVity of the constitutional violation against
the gravity of the defendant's crime in other cases.5
4. Professor John Kaplan would carve out such an exception for "treason, espionage, mur-
der, armed robbery and kidnapping by organized groups." Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusion-
ary Rule, 26 STAN. L. Rnv. 1027, 1046 (1974). Cf. Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24
CORNELL L.Q. 337, 379 (1939) (footnotes omitted):
[I]f the application of the [exclusionary] rule could be divorced from popular prejudices
concerning the liquor, gambling, and revenue laws, in the enforcement of which the federal
rule saw its greatest growth, and if a murderer, bank robber, or kidnapper should go free in
the face of evidence of his guilt, the public would surely arise and condemn the helplessness
of the courts against the depredations of the outlaws.
Even in those serious cases he would exempt from the exclusionary rule, adds Kaplan, supra,
at 1046 (footnote omitted), "some police violations would still invoke the exclusionary rule. The
Rochin v. California standard would still survive, so that evidence would be suppressed if the
violation of civil liberties were shocking enough." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), was
not a fourth amendment exclusionary rule case, but what might be called a "straight due pro-
cess" case. And the "conduct that shocks the conscience" test employed in that case, at least as
it has since been applied by the Court, furnishes precious little protection. It did not, for exam-
ple, prevent the admission of the evidence in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1952), despite the
fact that "[flew police measures have come to [the Court's] attention that more flagrantly, delib-
erately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth Amend-
ment." 347 U.S. at 132 (Jackson, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). In Irvine the police
had surreptitiously entered a home, installed a concealed microphone in a bedroom, and listened
to the conversations of the occupants for over a month. See also United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d
1460, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (R. Ginsburg, J., concurring) (rejecting Abscam defendant's "due
process" defense): "The requisite level of outrageousness ... is not established merely upon a
showing of obnoxious behavior or even flagrant misconduct on the part of the police; the broad
'fundamental fairness' guarantee, it appears from High Court decisions, is not transgressed ab-
sent 'coercion, violence or brutality to the person.'"
5. Arizona Justice James Cameron advocates such an approach. See State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz.
260, 270, 689 P.2d 519, 529 (1984) (Cameron, J., specially concurring); Cameron & Lustiger,
The Exclusionary Rule: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 101 F.R.D. 109, 142-52 (1984). Justice Cam-
eron would expand Professor Kaplan's category of serious offenses somewhat, see 142 Ariz. at
271, 689 P.2d at 530, but if his basic reasoning is sound it is hard to see why he does not expand
the categor, still further. See text at notes 124-25 infra. Indeed, it is hard to see, assuming that
this is the proper question, why the gravity of almost any felony would not exceed the gravity of
almost any fourth amendment violation. Surely many judges (including Justice Cameron) would
think it would. For my earlier criticism of Justice Cameron's views, see Collins, The New Feder-
alism Is Thriving Despite Setbacks and Losses in 1984, Natl. L.J., Apr. 29, 1985, at 32, 33.
October 1987]
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The complaint that the exclusionary rule does not take into ac-
count the reprehensibility of a particular defendant's crime (or the
gravity of crime generally) is not heard often. It is not nearly as com-
mon, for example, as the criticism that the exclusionary rule applies
(or, until recently, used to apply) 6 without regard to whether the po-
lice error is inadvertent or deliberate, minor or gross. Nevertheless,
the view that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
should always (or almost always) be admitted on "comparative repre-
hensibility" grounds, or at least that the exclusionary rule should turn
on the "comparative reprehensibility" of the defendant's crime and the
officer's illegality in a particular case, is not new.
This should come as no surprise. After all, as Judge (later Justice)
Benjamin Cardozo admonished us long ago - hundreds of law review
articles and thousands of speeches ago - in a portion of his famous
Defore opinion that few remember and even fewer, especially law
professors, take seriously: "To what [has been] written [about the ex-
clusionary rule], little of value can be added."'7
More than thirty years ago, Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr.,
made an argument similar to Judge Bork's and, as might be expected
of one who was perhaps the most formidable academic critic of the
then unfolding "revolution" in American criminal procedure, 8 he
made it very well. Asked Barrett:
Is not the court which excludes illegally obtained evidence in order to
avoid condoning the acts of the officer by the same token condoning the
illegal acts of the defendant? Suppose a policeman by an illegal search
has obtained evidence which establishes the defendant as a peddler of
narcotics to juveniles. Where lies the duty of the judge? Can we assume
from any general social point of view that the policeman's conduct is so
much more reprehensible than the defendant's that the duty of the judge
is to reject the evidence and free the defendant?
*.. Liberty demands that both official and private lawlessness shall
be curbed. And in any specific instance it is hard to say that, put to the
choice between permitting the consummation of the defendant's illegal
6. In 1984, after years of grumbling by various commentators and Justices about the "dispro-
portionate" impact of an "automatic" or "absolute" application of the exclusionary rule, the
Court in essence adopted the oft-proposed "inadvertent" or "honest police blunder" exception to
the rule, at least in search warrant cases. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachu-
setts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984). Three years later, the Court established another excep-
tion to the rule when an officer acts in objective reasonable reliance on a statute subsequently
determined to be enacted in violation of the fourth amendment. Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160
(1987).
7. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). Of course, in this very
opinion Judge Cardozo proceeded to write some of the most famous lines ever written oil the
subject.
8. See generally Kamisar, Edward L. Barrett, Jr.: The Critic with "That Quality of Judicious-
ness Demanded of the Court Itself" 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191 (1987).
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scheme and the policeman's illegal scheme, the court must of necessity
favor the defendant. 9
It takes no great leap of the imagination to determine how Barrett
would answer his own questions (assuming for the moment that they
are the right questions): The "peddler of narcotics to juveniles" is
plainly a more reprehensible cuss than the officer who violates the
fourth amendment. More generally, "when put to the choice between
permitting the consummation of the defendant's illegal scheme and
the policeman's" (again, assuming for the moment that this is an ap-
propriate way to frame the issue), a court should rarely, if ever, favor
the defendant.
Thus, Professor Barrett suggested, none too subtly, what some
sixty years ago the first notable critic of the exclusionary rule, Dean
John H. Wigmore, had stated bluntly:
[The exclusionary rule] puts [courts] in the position of assisting to under-
mine the foundations of the very institutions they are set there to protect.
It regards the over-zealous officer of the law as a greater danger to the
community than the unpunished murderer or embezzler or panderer.10
Arizona Supreme Court Justice James D. Cameron would not
carry the "comparative reprehensibility" approach quite as far as Wig-
more (although he would carry it too far to suit me). He would, for
exclusionary rule purposes, distinguish the murder defendant from the
embezzler and the panderer. But in certain enumerated "serious
cases" he would apply, "comparative reprehensibility" "with a
vengeance":II
[W]here the criminal conduct involved is more dangerous to society than
the police misconduct, it does not make sense to sacrifice the criminal
prosecution in order to deter the police.
[T]he gravity of ["serious" crimes] always will by definition ex-
ceed the gravity of any Fourth Amendment violation. This is because,
the rhetoric of some civil libertarians to the contrary, it is worse to be
9. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches - A Comment on People vs.
Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 565, 582 (1955).
10. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479, 482
(1922). The identical language appears in 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW 2184, at 637 (2d ed. 1923), and 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
19 2184, at 36-37 (3d ed. 1940). Indeed, this section of the Wigmore treatise is essentially a re-
print of his famous 1922 article. See also Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L.
REV. 169, 192 (1955) ("[When courts exclude illegally seized evidence, the citizen] knows only
that the activities of a dope-peddler, a notorious numbers racketeer, a score of gun-toters, a
counterfeiter, or a robber have not been considered wrongful enough by the judges to justify
conviction.").
11. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The aim [of
the new rules] in short is... voluntariness with a vengeance.").
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murdered or raped than to have one's house searched without a warrant,
no matter how aggravated the latter violation.
* . . [Under the proposed balancing approach to the exclusionary
rule], [t]he accused will be allowed to invoke the rule only where the
illegality committed against him is more grave than the crime he has
committed against others. Thus, the accused will be "let off" only where
he has suffered more than his purported victims. 12
II. "COMPARATIVE REPREHENSIBILITY" (OR THE "SERIOUS
CRIMES" EXCEPTION) AND "PROPORTIONALITY" (OR
THE "INADVERTENT" OR "HONEST POLICE
BLUNDER" EXCEPTION) COMPARED
AND CONTRASTED
At first blush the attack on the exclusionary rule for failure to bal-
ance the magnitude of the defendant's crime against the magnitude of
the officer's error (what I have called the "comparative reprehensibil-
ity" critique) looks like another and more popular criticism of the rule
- its failure to distinguish between inadvertent or slight police error
and deliberate or substantial police misconduct (variously called the
"inadvertence" exception, the "substantiality" test, the "good faith"
test, or "the idea of proportionality"). 13 The two lines of attack are
conceptually distinct, but they can be easily confused or lumped to-
gether. For both criticisms are directed at the "mechanical" and
"blind" application of the exclusionary rule,14 the "single, monolithic,
12. State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 270-72, 689 P.2d 519, 529-31 (1984) (Cameron, J., concur-
ring) (second emphasis added). As Justice Cameron points out, 142 Ariz. at 270 n.2, 689 P.2d at
529 n.2, "[m]uch if not most" of what he states in his concurring opinion appeared a short time
earlier in Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5. As he also makes plain, Justice Cameron is building
on a proposal advanced in Kaplan, supra note 4.
13. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (Powell, J.) ("The disparity in partic-
ular cases between the error committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty
defendant by application of the [exclusionary] rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that
is essential to the concept of justice."); 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe [exclusion-
ary] rule should be substantially modified so as to prevent its application in those many circum-
stances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the good-faith belief that his
conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief."); A MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2(2) (1975) ("A motion to suppress evidence
pursuant to this section shall be granted only if the court finds that the violation upon which it is
based was substantial...."); Coe, The ALI Substantiality Test: A Flexible Approach to the Exclu-
sionary Sanction, 10 GA. L. REv. 1, 27 (1975) (Model Code's "substantiality" test may be seen as
an outgrowth of "dissatisfaction with the drastic sanction of the rule" as exclusion "came to be
mandated for what were increasingly perceived to be technical and perhaps inadvertent viola-
tions by police."); Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1044 ("One superficially tempting modification would
be to hold the [exclusionary] rule inapplicable where the constitutional violation by the police
officer was inadvertent.").
14. See Burger, C.J., dissenting in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 416 (1977) ("[The
course taken by the majority] mechanically and blindly keeps reliable evidence from juries
whether the claimed constitutional violation involves gross police misconduct or honest human
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and drastic judicial response" to police error once that error is found
to be of constitutional dimension.' 5 And both types of critics advocate
a compromise position (although a different kind of compromise) be-
tween those who would retain an unmodified exclusionary rule and
those who would abolish the rule altogether.
Moreover, and this is probably the greatest source of confusion,
both types of critics lament that relentless application of the exclusion-
ary rule produces "disproportionate" results (but different kinds of
disproportionate results). And the "comparative reprehensibility"
critic, no less than the proponent of proportionality, can state her case
in terms of "disparity" or "disproportionality" (albeit different kinds
of disparity or disproportionality).
When proponents of the proportionality approach (or "inadver-
tent" police error exception) complain that rigid application of the ex-
clusionary rule offends the idea of proportionality, they have in mind
those instances when an "honest" or "inadvertent" police blunder af-
fords a guilty defendant - any guilty defendant - an unacceptable
windfall.1 6 These critics of the exclusionary rule point to the disparity
or disproportion between the police error and the "drastic" remedy of
exclusion. 17
When proponents of the "comparative reprehensibility" approach
(or "serious crimes" exception) protest that rigid application of the
exclusionary rule produces disproportionate results, they have in mind
those instances where the murderer or armed robber "goes free" de-
error."). See also Burger, C.J., dissenting in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
388, 420 (1971) ("Instead of continuing to enforce the suppression doctrine inflexibly, rigidly,
and mechanically, we should... acknowledge its shortcomings.").
15. See Burger, C.J., dissenting in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 418 ("[T]he exclusionary rule has
increasingly been characterized by a single, monolithic, and drastic judicial response to all official
violations of legal norms.").
16. See, e.g., the quotation from Justice Powell, supra note 13, speaking for the Court in
Stone v. Powell.
17. After decrying the exclusionary rule's "drastic judicial response" to all fourth amend-
ment violations in his Bivens dissent, Chief Justice Burger continues: "Inadvertent errors of
judgment that do not work any grave injustice will inevitably occur under the pressure of police
work. These honest mistakes have been treated in the same way as deliberate and flagrant Irvine-
type violations of the Fourth Amendment." 403 U.S. at 418. The Irvine case is discussed briefly
in note 4 supra. See also Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50
TEXAS L. RE. 736, 744-45 (1972) (referring to the defendant in Irvine, a "bookmaker," and the
defendant in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)):
I think it unfortunate that the conviction of the bookmaker was allowed to stand and that it
would have been unfortunate if the conviction of Miss Mapp had been allowed to stand.
The Exclusionary Rule is drastic medicine and I would save it for drastic cases in which the
conduct of the police was outrageous, as it was in those cases. ...
If the [Model Code's substantiality test] were the law, there would be no profit in deliber-
ate police lawlessness but criminals could not claim a windfall from insignificant mistakes in
the course of good faith law enforcement.
October 1987]
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spite the fact that his misconduct is more dangerous or reprehensible
than the officer's - and this is so even when the officer has committed
a "deliberate" or "gross" constitutional violation. 18 These critics un-
derscore the disparity or disproportion between the officer's miscon-
duct and the defendant's.
Both groups of critics deplore the "universal 'capital punish-
ment' " inflicted on all evidence once constitutional error is shown in
its acquisition.' 9 But they propose different cures. Advocates of the
proportionality approach in essence want the courts to find "aggravat-
ing circumstances" (i.e., "deliberate" or "gross" police error) before
imposing exclusionary rule "capital punishment." Proponents of the
"comparative reprehensibility" approach, on the other hand, urge the
courts to take into account what they regard as "mitigating circum-
stances" (i.e., that the constitutional error occurred in the pursuit of a
dangerous criminal) and to withhold "the extreme sanction of exclu-
sion" 20 when such circumstances are present.
To be sure, both criticisms (or proposed modifications) of the ex-
clusionary rule can be combined in one assault on the rule. Judge Car-
18. As noted earlier, Justice Cameron would establish a flat exception to the exclusionary
rule for certain serious crimes "no matter how aggravated the [fourth amendment] violation"
(emphasis added). See text at note 12 supra. Later on in his concurring opinion in Bolt, 142
Ariz. at 272-73, 659 P.2d at 531-32, Justice Cameron observes: "Per se categories could resolve
the easy ["comparative reprehensibility"] cases .... One such category could be established for
types of crimes deemed so serious that no search or seizure violation would ever justify applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule ......
In his article, which treats the subject more comprehensively, Justice Cameron agrees with
Professor Charles Alan Wright that the evidence should have been excluded in Mapp and Irvine,
but not simply because the police illegality in those cases was flagrant - only because the gravity
of the police misconduct exceeded the gravity of the defendants' petty crimes. See Cameron &
Lustiger, supra note 5, at 146. Unlike Professor Wright, Justice Cameron would not save the
exclusionary rule for all instances of "outrageous" police misconduct:
What [Professor Wright] and others who rely on Irvine and Mapp overlook, however, is that
flagrantly illegal searches do not take place only against petty criminals such as bookies [Mr.
Irvine] and owners of dirty pictures [Miss Mapp]; they also take place against very serious
criminals such as murderers, kidnappers, rapists and foreign spies.
Id.
Professor Kaplan's "serious crimes" exception to the exclusionary rule is not as absolute as
Justice Cameron's. In theory at least, a defendant whose offense fell within Kaplan's serious
crime category could still exclude the evidence if he persuaded a court that the police misconduct
"shocks the conscience." See note 4 supra. However, this does not strike me as a qualification of
an otherwise flat exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, but rather a recognition
that a "straight due process" test would still apply, as it did before the Mapp Court imposed the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule on the state courts as a matter of federal constitutional law.
"But the demonstrated incapacity of [prior doctrine] to meet the problem of the egregious [po-
lice] wrong must be regarded as an important milestone on the road to Mapp." F. Allen, Feder-
alism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 10.
19. See Burger, C.J., dissenting in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 419 ("I submit that society has ... [a]
right to expect rationally graded responses from judges in place of the universal 'capital punish-
ment' we inflict on all evidence when police error is shown in its acquisition.").
20. The Court described the exclusionary rule that way in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 926 (1984).
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dozo did just that in a single sentence, noting that if the exclusionary
rule were adopted in its present shape, "[t]he pettiest peace officer
would have it in his power through overzeal or indiscretion to confer
immunity upon an offender for crimes the most fiagitious."'2'
However, the "comparative reprehensibility" and proportionality
approaches need not, and usually have not, been combined. For ex-
ample, at least one proponent of a serious crimes exception to the ex-
clusionary rule has emphatically rejected a proposed distinction
between "inadvertent" (i.e., "slight") and "deliberate" (i.e., "substan-
tial") fourth amendment violations. 22 He would abolish the rule in
murder, kidnapping, and other serious cases, but apply it without re-
serve elsewhere, however inadvertent or slight the constitutional error
that crops up elsewhere.
Moreover, neither the six members of the Court who recently
voted for a "good faith" (actually a "reasonable mistake") exception
to the exclusionary rule,23 nor, in the main, those on or off the bench
who have decried the disproportionate impact of the exclusionary rule,
have urged consideration of the gravity or reprehensibility of the de-
fendant's misconduct as well as the insignificance of the transgressing
officer's. 24 Their complaint has been that the exclusionary rule treats
"vastly dissimilar cases" of official lawlessness "as if they were the
same,"' 25 not that it treats vastly dissimilar cases of private lawlessness
indiscriminately.
Once the police misconduct is deemed sufficiently "serious" or
"substantial" 
- once it is established that the transgressing officers
were "dishonest" or "reckless" or "could not have harbored an objec-
tively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause" 26 exclusion
of the evidence is an "appropriate" or proportionate response - re-
gardless, it seems, whether the defendant is charged with shoplifting
or skyjacking, bookmaking or bomb-throwing. What matters - and
evidently what only matters - is the extent to which the police have
21. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (1926).
22. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1044-45.
23. Leon, 468 U.S. 897.
24. See, ag., Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978); Coe, supra note 13; H.
FRIENDLY, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, in BENCHMARKS 260-62 (1967).
Justice Cameron is an exception. He would support a "good faith" or "inadvertent" police error
exception to the exclusionary rule, see 142 Ariz. at 272, 689 P.2d at 531, but he would also carve
out an exception for "all cases in which the police acted with less than good faith, but their
actions are outweighed by the egregious nature of the crime." 142 Ariz. at 272, 689 P.2d at 531
(emphasis added).
25. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
26. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
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deviated from prescribed norms, not the extent to which the defendant
has.
I have dwelt on the distinction between "comparative reprehensi-
bility" and "proportionality" or "substantiality" because, for reasons I
shall set forth in the next section, I consider the first approach a much
more pernicious modification of the exclusionary rule than the second
and because the second approach has commanded much more support
than the first - until now.
But there is no guarantee that this state of affairs will continue.
The idea of "proportionality" or "substantiality" percolated in the
legal literature and in various concurring and dissenting opinions2 7 for
a number of years before it won wide acceptance.28 The notion of
"comparative reprehensibility" has been injected into the stream (or
should one say, flood?) of commentary about the exclusionary rule.
Some day some version of this notion may also be embraced by a ma-
jority of the Court.
The majority opinion in United States v. Leon 29 explicitly states
that the cost-benefit balancing in which the Court has engaged for
years "forcefully suggests" and "provides strong support" for the
modification of the exclusionary rule it established in that case.30 But
"comparative reprehensibility" may also be viewed as a species of cost-
benefit balancing. 31 It would be regrettable, but not too surprising, if
someday the Rehnquist Court viewed it this way and further narrowed
the thrust of the exclusionary rule accordingly. Indeed, it is not incon-
ceivable that someday the Court might regard the notion of "compara-
tive reprehensibility" as a reason, or one more reason, for abolishing
the exclusionary rule altogether.
Before getting to what I think is the heart of the matter, I would
like to make a relatively small point, but not, I think, a trivial one.
The fact that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was or should have
been excluded does not necessarily "turn a criminal loose upon soci-
ety." At a second trial a defendant may be (and not a few have been)
reconvicted on the basis of other admissible and legally sufficient evi-
27. Most of these proposals or suggestions were made in the post-Mapp era, see the materials
cited in notes 13-14 & 24 supra, but five years before that famous decision was handed down,
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer suggested that "a line may be drawn between the
casual and perhaps unintentional police violation of constitutional rights and that which is stud-
ied and deliberate." Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15
(1956).
28. See note 6 supra.
29. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
30. See 468 U.S. at 909, 913.
31. This is the primary thrust of Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5. See id. at 142-54.
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dence. Of course, now that it is clear that fourth amendment viola-
tions are subject to a rule of harmless error 32 (which was not the case
when Professor Barrett, let alone Judge Cardozo and Dean Wigmore,
were writing about the exclusionary rule),33 an appellate court may
rule that, although the court below erred in admitting the challenged
evidence, its introduction was "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." 34
Moreover, now that the Court has expressly sanctioned the "inevi-
table discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule35 (an exception no
court had yet applied when Cardozo and Wigmore were writing about
the general subject, and one the Supreme Court did not approve until
long after Barrett stopped writing about the subject), 36 an appellate
court may remand for further consideration whether, or itself deter-
mine that, the unconstitutionally acquired items or information ulti-
mately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.37
III. A HARD LOOK AT "COMPARATIVE REPREHENSIBILITY"
BALANCING GENERALLY AND A "SERIOUS CRIMES"
EXCEPTION IN PARTICULAR
A. At What Phase of the Criminal Process is the Seriousness of the
Crime To Be Determined?
If a "serious crimes" exception to the exclusionary rule were to be
carved out, or if the admissibility of unconstitutionally seized evidence
turned to a significant degree on the reprehensibility of the defendant's
32. Although the issue had been left open in earlier cases, in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970), the Court ruled, surprisingly without discussion or dissent, that if certain evidence
admitted in the case had been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, the error was
subject to a harmless-error rule. See generally, e.g., Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal
Constitutional Error - A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1976);
Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421
(1980); Stacy & Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1988).
33. "Prior to the 1960's, it was generally assumed that constitutional violations could never
be regarded as harmless error." 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6(c)
(1984).
34. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 53.
35. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
36. The first clear application of this exception is said to be Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d
790 (2d Cir. 1943). See 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.4(a), at 379 (2d ed. 1987). But the rule was not expressly sanctioned by the
Supreme Court until forty years later. Nix, 467 U.S. 431. Although Nix is a sixth amendment
case it is plain that it applies to the fourth amendment as well. See 4 W. LAFAVE, supra,
§ 11.4(a). Indeed, Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Nix "seeks to justify the adop-
tion of the inevitable discovery exception by analogy to the independent source doctrine of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule." Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the
Scaffold: But Was it a Fair Trial? 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 135 (1984).
37. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
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crime, it would be theoretically possible to admit the challenged evi-
dence on a contingent basis. The judge could make an initial determi-
nation that the unconstitutionally obtained evidence was admissible
and then instruct the jury that it could consider the evidence if it
found the defendant guilty of certain serious charges, but not if it
found him guilty of certain lesser charges.
It is unlikely that such a procedure would pass constitutional mus-
ter. Nor should it. The jury could hardly be expected to forget or
ignore cogent evidence once it has been disclosed. In determining
whether the defendant was guilty of a lesser included offense the jury
would likely be influenced by the damning evidence it was supposed to
disregard.38
How, then, should a "serious crime" exception to the exclusionary
rule, or, more generally, a "comparative reprehensibility" test, be
administered?
Should the gravity of the defendant's lawlessness turn on the na-
ture and magnitude of the crime the officer believes he is investigating?
Professor Kaplan quickly rejects such a rule, and properly so, for in
practice it would mean that "[o]ften the court would simply have to
take the policeman's word as to what crime he was investigating. ' 39
Kaplan believes, however, that "grave problems of adminis-
trability" 40 could be avoided if the defendant's reprehensibility, for
purposes of the exclusionary rule, turned on the crime charged by the
prosecutor: "All any court need do to apply the [proposed modifica-
tion of the exclusionary rule] is to look at the crime charged."' 41
But why isn't this approach subject to the same criticism Professor
Kaplan made with respect to a test that turns on the crime the officer
believes he is investigating? Why wouldn't a "serious crimes" excep-
tion based on the crime charged mean, as a practical matter, that often
the court would have to take the prosecutor's word as to what crime
was the appropriate one to charge?
38. Cf Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (striking down a procedure whereby if the
evidence presented a "fair question" as to the "voluntariness" of a confession, the trial judge
submitted that issue, along with all others, to the jury).
39. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1047.
40. Id.
41. Id. Evidently, Justice Cameron would also base reprehensibility on the severity of the
crime charged by the prosecutor. See Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 151 n.198. But
concurring in State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 273 n.3, 689 P.2d at 532 n.3, he states that if there were
no exception to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in the instant case, "a balancing test
would suggest that [the challenged] evidence be excluded because the police transgressions are
both serious and systemic, and the crime as indicated by the sentence imposed (concurrent three
year terms of probation) is neither serious nor violent" (emphasis added). Of course, a ruling on
the admissibility of the evidence is made before sentence is imposed, indeed, before the defendant
is convicted.
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When the police make an arrest for a misdemeanor not committed
in their presence, but lack the statutory authority to do so, they some-
times stretch or manipulate the facts in order to justify their action as
a "felony arrest."' 42 If a "serious crimes" exception to the exclusion-
ary rule were in effect, or even if a general "comparative reprehensibil-
ity" test were adopted, wouldn't the prosecutor succumb to the
temptation, at least sometimes, to charge a greater crime or a higher
degree of crime than the circumstances warranted so that she could
''save" a case based on unconstitutionally seized evidence?
Suppose, for example, that armed robbery were one of the specified
serious crimes "exempted" from the exclusionary rule and that the
police obtained evidence of the robbery by violating the fourth amend-
ment. Suppose further that the robbery victim "didn't remember" or
"wasn't sure" whether the person who robbed him had a gun or a
knife and that the alleged robber was apprehended a few blocks away
without a weapon. Even if the evidence only supported, and the pros-
ecutor only expected to obtain, a conviction for a lesser degree of rob-
bery, wouldn't a prosecutor be tempted to charge the defendant with
armed robbery (or robbery in the first degree)? The prosecutor could
maintain, at the pre-trial stage at any rate, that the defendant probably
disposed of the weapon just before he was caught.43
A proponent of "comparative reprehensibility" might deny that a
prosecutor would ever resort to such shady tactics. But Justice Cam-
eron maintains that "prosecuting attorneys are forced [evidently be-
cause they are so indignant about the prospect of a 'guilty criminal'
escaping unpunished] to rely on perjured or at least highly questiona-
ble testimony to maintain the admissibility of relevant evidence." 44 If
this is so and if a group of "serious crimes" were exempted from the
exclusionary rule, why wouldn't prosecuting attorneys be "forced," or
at least sorely tempted, to lodge the highest charge possible in order
"to maintain the admissibility of relevant evidence"?
I find it hard to avoid the conclusion that in practice an exception
to the exclusionary rule for major or dangerous offenses would mean
that defendants who did not actually commit, or at least were never
convicted of, serious crimes, would nevertheless be prevented from
challenging unconstitutionally seized evidence because they were ac-
cused of committing a serious crime. Thus one could be convicted of a
42. See W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 30
(1965).
43. Cf Heumann & Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition of Plea Bargaining: The
Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 LAW & SocY. REV. 393, 402-03 (1979).
44. Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 138 (emphasis added).
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relatively minor crime, e.g., simple assault, robbery in the third degree,
or burglary in the third degree, on the basis of unconstitutionally
seized evidence (even evidence obtained as a result of "substantial" or
"gross" police misconduct) because and only because he was charged
with a serious crime, e.g., aggravated assault, robbery in the first de-
gree, or burglary in the first degree.45
"Overcharging" already is, and has long been, a serious problem.
In his classic study of the use of prosecutor's discretion in plea bar-
gaining, Professor Albert Alschuler noted:
Defense attorneys in various jurisdictions complain that prosecutors
charge robbery when they should charge larceny from the person...
[and] that they charge assault with intent to commit murder when they
should charge some form of battery.... In general, defense attorneys in
some cities say [that] prosecutors charge "the first degree of everything"
but accept a guilty plea to "the second degree of any crime" without
serious negotiation.46
Wouldn't a "comparative reprehensibility" test, to say nothing of a
per se exception to the application of the exclusionary rule for "serious
crimes," furnish the prosecutor one more reason to inflate the initial
charge?
Justice Cameron does warn us that in applying his proposed modi-
fication of the exclusionary rule "trial judges should keep in mind that
prosecutors sometimes 'overcharge' for strategic purposes."' 47 "If this
occurs," he continues, "the trial judge should determine whether the
charge is fair for the purposes of the motion to suppress, given the
facts of the particular case."'48
But how can a trial judge tell, when asked to rule on a pre-trial
motion to suppress, whether "overcharging" is occurring? How can
she tell at this early stage whether or not the charge is "fair"? "The
facts of the particular case" have not yet unfolded. That is why we
hold trials.
Would it suffice if the prosecutor gave the trial judge "assurances"
that the charge was "fair"? Or must she produce the robbery victim
or a by-stander who testifies that the defendant used a deadly weapon?
May the defense lawyer then refute this testimony by putting his client
on the stand? Or by producing other witnesses? Again, isn't this what
45. As I maintain at text at notes 94-123 infra, if it makes sense to carve out a "serious
crimes" exception to the exclusionary rule, it also makes sense to include, and there will be
considerable pressure to include, such crimes as "aggravated assault" or "assault in the first
degree" and "aggravated burglary" or "burglary in the first degree."
46. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 89-90
(1968). See also J. EISENSTEIN, POLITICS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 113 (1973).
47. Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 151 n.198.
48. Id.
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the trial on the merits is all about? And would critics of the exclusion-
ary rule, who lament "the tremendous impact that the rule has on the
sheer work load of the courts," 49 welcome a pretrial adversary pro-
ceeding on the degree of a defendant's criminality?
For purposes of the rest of the discussion, I shall assume that the
administrative problems I think are raised by a "serious crimes" ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule, or by "comparative reprehensibility"
balancing generally, can somehow be satisfactorily resolved.
B. Balancing the Seriousness of the Police Misconduct Against the
Gravity of the Defendant's Crime
As already indicated,50 Professor Kaplan rejected an "inadver-
tence" or "honest police blunder" exception to the exclusionary rule:
To [adopt such an exception] would add one more factfinding operation,
and an especially difficult one to administer, to those already required of
a lower judiciary which, to be frank, has hardly been very trustworthy in
this area.... So long as [front-line] judges remain opposed on principle
to the sanction they are supposed to be enforcing, the addition of another
especially subjective factual determination will constitute almost an open
invitation to nullification at the trial court level. 5 '
A test that turned on the "comparative reprehensibility" of the of-
ficer's and the defendant's lawlessness in a particular case would be
even more vulnerable to Kaplan's criticism because such a test would
be a good deal more unruly. (Perhaps that is why Kaplan eschewed
"comparative reprehensibility" balancing at large and proposed only
an exception to the exclusionary rule for the most serious cases.)
I can already hear the taunts: "You and Kaplan may have ob-
jected to a so-called 'good faith' exception to the exclusionary rule.
But, fortunately, neither you nor Kaplan have any votes. A majority
of those who do adopted just such an exception."152
There would be some force in such a retort, but it would not be
quite accurate. As I have noted elsewhere, ever since the so-called
"good faith" exception was first suggested or proposed, "its critics
have been shooting at a moving target."' 53 Over the years, evidently in
response to criticism, the proposed exception has undergone signifi-
49. Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Cost and Viable Alternatives, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 16,
18 (Summer/Fall, 1982). This criticism of the exclusionary rule by Judge Wilkey is quoted with
approval in Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 139.
50. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
51. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1045.
52. See note 6 supra.
53. Y. Kamisar, The Court's Growing Hostility to the Exclusionary Rule: Leon, Sheppard,
and Lopez-Mendoza, Prepared Remarks at the U.S. Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference
20.7 (Sept. 14, 1984) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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cant change. It has evolved from a subjective test to a "two-pronged"
test ((a) did the officer actually believe that he was complying with the
law? and (b) if so, would a reasonably trained officer have so be-
lieved?) and then, to a purely "objective" test (to the extent that a
"reasonable person" test is, or can be, "purely" objective).54
Thus, the Leon Court emphasized that "the standard we adopt to-
day is an objective one" 55 and one that "requires officers to have a
reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits. ' 56 The Court "es-
chew[ed] inquiries into the subjective beliefs of law enforcement of-
ficers," believing that sending the courts "on an expedition into the
minds of police officers would produce a grave and fruitless misalloca-
tion of judicial resources." 57
In short, the so-called "good faith" exception adopted in 1984 -
one "confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a rea-
sonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was ille-
gal" 58 was not the same "especially subjective" test Professor Kaplan
criticized ten years earlier.
But "comparative reprehensibility" balancing would call for "espe-
cially subjective" determinations and would constitute, to borrow
Kaplan's language, "almost an open invitation to nullification [of the
exclusionary rule] at the trial court level." 59 (That, some proponents
of this approach might say, is the whole idea.)
"Comparative reprehensibility" balancing would be reminiscent of
the pre-Miranda due process "voluntariness" test for admitting con-
fessions. When that test prevailed "[n]ot only were trial judges left
without guidance for resolving confession claims but they were virtu-
ally invited to give weight to their subjective preferences when per-
forming the elusive task of balancing."' 60 Furthermore - and these
comments on the inadequacy of appellate review would also seem ap-
plicable to a "comparative reprehensibility" test for admitting evi-
dence seized in violation of the fourth amendment -
The ambiguity of the due process test and its subtle mixture of factual
and legal elements discouraged active review even by the most conscien-
54. See id. at 20.7-20.10. See also 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 36, § 1.3; Wasserstrom & Mer-
tens, supra note 36, at 117-18.
55. 468 U.S. at 919 n.20.
56. 468 U.S. at 920 n.20.
57. 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.
58. 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.
59. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1045.
60. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869-70 (1981). See also Y.
KAMISAR, What is an "Involuntary" Confession?, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFES-
SIONS 1 (1980).
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tious appellate judges. Moreover, when higher courts did attempt to ad-
dress confessions questions, they found themselves so wholly at sea that
the appearance of principled judicial decision-making inevitably suffered,
whether or not they chose to hold the confession inadmissible.61
Where else will a conscientious judge who embarks on "compara-
tive reprehensibility" balancing find herself but "wholly at sea"? How
does she go about determining whether the burglary of a coin shop
exceeds the gravity of a search without a warrant? Whether extortion
exceeds the gravity of kicking in a door without probable cause?
Whether drug dealing exceeds the gravity of surreptitiously entering a
home, without a court order, to install bugging equipment?
No violation of the fourth amendment would be too serious to pre-
clude the admissibility of the evidence. The defendant's crime might
be still worse. The stain of deliberate or gross - even flagrant, Irvine-
type - police misconduct could be bleached by the "dangerousness"
or "heinousness" of the crime the police were investigating.62 On the
other hand, no offense committed by a defendant would be too petty to
assure application of the exclusionary rule. A run-of-the mill crime,
even a relatively trivial one, might still exceed the gravity of a minor
violation of the fourth amendment. Thus, even violators of the liquor,
gambling, and revenue laws63 could be convicted on the basis of un-
constitutionally seized evidence if the police error were not deemed
sufficiently "substantial."
I see nothing in "comparative reprehensibility" balancing that im-
plies any inherent restraint on the erratic, indeed capricious, applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule. A judge, even one acting in good-faith (if
I may use that term), could characterize almost any felony, certainly
almost any major one, as more reprehensible than almost any fourth
61. Schulhofer, supra note 60, at 870. Adds Schulhofer, id.:
The Supreme Court, which has special reasons to guard the objectivity and perceived
legitimacy of its processes, was particularly vulnerable to institutional damage on this
ground.... Had the Court been willing to hear more confessions cases, the threat to its
legitimacy and prestige probably would have been aggravated by the very actions that were
at the same time necessary to exert more effective control over the lower courts.
Even if appellate courts were able, and willing, to correct erroneous trial court "comparative
reprehensibility" judgments, as my colleague Frederick Schauer has noted in Schauer, Slippery
Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REV. 361, 378 n.43 (1985):
[C]orrection takes time and effort, implicating a different kind of slippage to the extent that
the principles may go unprotected until the appellate process reaches its end and to the
extent that the effort and expense of an appeal deters some from appealing meritorious
claims.... When Holmes noted that "[t]he power to tax is not the power to destroy while
this Court sits," Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) ... he may not fully
have appreciated the implications of the fact that "this Court sits" only about 151 times a
year, at least when speaking of full decisions, with opinions, on the merits.
62. Justice Cameron leaves no doubt about this. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
63. Cf Plumb, supra note 4.
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amendment violation.64
Trial judges, we are advised, already "bend findings of facts to
avoid the exclusion of relevant evidence."' 65 Perhaps so. But trial
judges can, or will, "bend the facts" only so much. "Comparative rep-
rehensibility," however, could simply become a "catch-all" for admit-
ting unconstitutionally obtained evidence when judges are unable, or
unwilling, to bend the facts.66 Such a test could give judges a " 'chan-
cellor's foot' veto" over the exclusionary rule.67
To be sure, as Dean John Ely has observed, "One doesn't have to
be much of a lawyer to recognize that even the clearest verbal formula
can be manipulated. ' 68 But, he quickly added, "it's a very bad lawyer
who supposes that manipulability and infinite manipulability are the
same thing."'69
"While it is hard indeed for any judge to set apart the question of
guilt or innocence of a particular defendant and focus solely upon the
procedural aspects of the case,"' 70 it is hardest of all for a trial judge to
do so. For, as one such judge explained, "we have an eyewitness seat
and get splattered with the blood. '71
Is a trial judge who is told to take into account the gravity of the
defendant's crime - indeed, to give it significant, perhaps decisive,
weight - likely to focus solely upon the procedural aspects of the case
or likely to "give way to the overwhelming relevance of the evi-
dence"? 72 Given the "counterintuitiveness" of the exclusionary rule
and the "unattractiveness" of those seeking to invoke it, isn't a judge
64. Cf Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980), where, in the course of overturning
a death sentence based on a statutory provision authorizing capital punishment for murder when
the offense is "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman," because the state courts had
failed to adopt a narrowing construction giving some discernible content to the provision, a four-
Justice plurality, per Stewart, J., observed: "There is nothing in these few words, standing alone,
that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sen-
tence. A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as 'outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.'"
65. Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 139. See also Wilkey, A Call for Alternatives to the
Exclusionary Rule, 62 JUDICATURE 351, 355-56 (1979).
66. Cf Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 429.
67. Cf United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (entrapment defense "not intended
to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it
did not approve").
68. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 112 (1980).
69. Id.
70. Schaefer, supra note 27, at 7.
71. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 243 (1977). See also Schaefer, supra
note 27, at 7 ("The more remote the court [from the local atmosphere], the easier it is to consider
the case in terms of a hypothetical defendant accused of crime, instead of a particular man whose
guilt has been established.").
72. In his early years on the California Supreme Court, recalled the late Roger Traynor,
"[f]ugitive misgivings about admitting illegally obtained evidence gave way to the overwhelming
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who is granted great freedom to balance comparative wrongs likely to
tilt the balancing heavily in favor of the government?73 (Once again,
that, some proponents of the "comparative reprehensibility" approach
might say, is the whole idea.)
C. Carving Out a "'Serious Crimes" Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule
In some respects a "serious crimes" or "most serious cases" excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule seems more palatable than open-ended
"comparative reprehensibility" balancing. Unlike a totality-of-the-
circumstances "criminal reprehensibility" approach, a flat exception
to the exclusionary rule for "the relatively small class of the most seri-
ous cases" 74 would appear to be a simple test to administer. But this
test, too, is not without its problems.
"A shocking crime," Justice Frankfurter once observed, "puts law
to its severest test."' 75 But law would fail that test - it would bow, or
at least be perceived as bowing, before the natural impulses aroused by
a heinous crime - if there were a serious crimes exception to the ex-
clusionary rule.76
Such an exception would mean that in a criminal prosecution
against a serious or dangerous offender the Court would tolerate an
"open defiance" as well as a "manifest neglect" of the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 77 In such cases, the police
weight of the evidence." Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J.
319, 321.
73. Cf Schauer, supra note 61, at 376-77 (footnote omitted):
That slippery slope arguments emerge so commonly with respect to freedom of speech is
quite likely a function of the extent to which many of the principles of free speech are
counterintuitive to prosecutors, jurors, the public, and even the bench. . . . [Jurors] are
asked to protect those who are unpopular, such as the Hare Krishnas and the Jehovah's
Witnesses, and those who are simply wicked, including the Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan.
The decisionmaker's negative view of the parties is likely to lead to mistakes of a particular
kind, to oversuppression rather than undersuppression, in the application of free speech
principles, and these mistakes serve to create the special slippery slope danger.
These special features of many free speech cases are perhaps even more prominent in
criminal procedure cases. Virtually every case involving constitutional criminal procedure
involves a fairly unattractive claimant of the constitutional right. In cases involving illegal
search and seizure.., it is frequently obvious that the claimant of the right is in fact guilty
of the crime charged .... In light of the nature of both the litigants and the issue involved,
an advocate can persuasively argue that the risk of mistakes in favor of the rights of criminal
defendants is much lower than the risk of mistakes to their detriment.
74. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1046.
75. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 477 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
76. Law would also fail that test in cases of "shocking crimes" if the admissibility of proba-
tive evidence turned on the "comparative reprehensibility" of the investigating officer's miscon-
duct and the defendant's crime. For however deliberate or substantial the police illegality in
pursuit of the perpetrator of a shocking crime, the illegality would almost never be more repre-
hensible than the defendant's crime.
77. Cf Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) ("To sanction such proceedings
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could search without warrants and without good cause, or any cause,
and yet not jeopardize the government's case. Presumably they could
also tap phones and bug homes and offices free of any external re-
straints. 78 And once they acquired probative evidence, however they
acquired it (short of brutality or physical violence) law enforcement
officials could use it against the defendant with impunity. 79
1. What Message Would a "Serious Crimes" Exception Send?
Search and seizure issues do not crop up often in murder or other
major non-drug cases.80 But they do arise. And "in its concrete em-
[leading to convictions by means of unconstitutional searches] would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, in-
tended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.").
78. If an exception to the exclusionary rule were established for fourth amendment violations
in serious criminal cases, a similar exception would certainly seem to be in order for other trust-
worthy evidence that was merely the product of a statutory violation, i~e., a violation of laws
regulating police use of electronic surveillance.
79. Proponents of a "serious case" exception to the exclusionary rule maintain that in prac-
tice the courts often carve out such an exception anyway, albeit covertly, and that this is "a good
reason for adopting [such an exception] straightforwardly." Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1046. See
also Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 148-51. I wonder whether this argument convinces
any but those already persuaded to adopt an exception for murder and other serious crimes.
That judges and juries have the power to ignore the mandate of a statutory or constitutional
provision and do so with some frequency in a given area does not strike me as "a good reason" in
and of itself for granting them the right to do so. Cf B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 129 (1921), quoted in M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY:
A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 87-88 (1973). To recognize that a
judge sometimes disregards the law in the face of compelling facts
is not to say that a judge's perception of the limits upon what he can do is not an important
determinant of what he in fact does. The more strongly these limits are felt, the greater thejustification - or "surcharge," to use [the term of M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra, at 27-
28] - needed by the judge to persuade himself of the rightness of transgressing these limits.
Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: "Jury Nullification" and Legitimated Disobedi-
ence, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1293 (1974). But see Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification:
The Contours of a Controversy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51 (arguing that
jury nullification benefits the legal process).
No doubt some juries sentence a murderer to death on the premise that "murders most brut-
ish and bestial" are most deserving of capital punishment, when such killings may not even be
murder in the first degree. Cf Austin v. United States, 382 F.2d 129, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But
this is no reason in and of itself to encourage juries to do so, or make it easier for them to do so,
by telling them simply that they may do so when the murder is "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman." See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (discussed in note 64 supra).
No doubt juries sometimes, and in an earlier day frequently, invoked the doctrine of the "unwrit-
ten law" and acquitted a defendant who had killed his wkfe's lover. But this in itself is not
sufficient cause to tell jurors explicitly that they may do so. See, e.g., Burger v. State, 238 Ga.
171, 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977). See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.10
(b)(5) (1986). Nor is it good cause to amend the law of homicide so as to recognize the "honor
defense" formally.
Moreover, in some areas, if "official permission [is granted] to engage in what is at least
suspect ... the fear is that this will be taken as implicit, if not explicit, permission to go one step
further." Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?. 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1075, 1084
(1986). "The mere fact that courts will fold under pressure... does not dictate that they should
be told that they may fold under pressure, because the effect of the message may be to increase
the likelihood of folding even when the pressure is less." Id. at 1084 n.l 1.
80. See notes 118-23 infra and accompanying text.
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bodiment of an individual and his struggles" the dramatic story of a
single case "has the same advantage that a play or a novel has over a
general discussion of ethics or political theory." '81 But if a serious
crimes exception to the exclusionary rule were adopted we should not
like the lesson that might be taught by the dramatic story of a single
case: In a murder or other serious case, acquiring evidence of guilt
would be everything. How the government acquired it, so long as the
evidence were relevant and reliable, would mean nothing. The court
before whom the evidence was brought would be neither interested nor
concerned about its provenance. There would be no point in the de-
fendant arguing that the evidence against him was obtained by deliber-
ately or grossly violating the fourth amendment. What if it were?
A decade ago, speaking for the Court, Justice Powell observed that
the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence demonstrates
that "our society attaches serious consequences to violation of consti-
tutional rights"82 and that this demonstration "is thought to en-
courage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers
who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into
their value system." 83 What would the repeal of the exclusionary rule
in certain enumerated serious cases demonstrate? How would it affect
police-prosecution thinking? If the exclusionary rule is "a statement
that we are serious about lowering the number of fourth amendment
violations in our society, ' ' 84 what kind of message would we be send-
ing if we carved out a flat exception to the rule for serious cases?
According to the most comprehensive study of police attitudes to-
ward the exclusionary rule,85 the police "have great difficulty believing
that standards can have any real meaning if the government can profit
from violating them" 86 and, regardless of what "substitute remedies"
may be provided, they "are bound to view the elimination of the exclu-
sionary rule as an indication that the fourth amendment is not a seri-
81. E. CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 22 (1963).
82. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976).
83. 428 U.S. at 492. At this point, Justice Powell cites Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure. 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 665, 756 (1970). At the page cited, then Professor
Oaks, a strong critic of the rule, recognizes that "entirely apart from any direct deterrent effect
... [the exclusionary rule] gives credibility to the constitutional guarantees."
84. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1055.
85. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure. 49 UMKC L. REV.
24 (1980). Professor Loewenthal, who teaches police officer students at John Jay College of
Criminal Justice of the City University of New York, conducted many interviews with police
commanders on all levels, as well as with his police officer students. He was also a participant-
observer on forty tours of duty concerning various phases of police work.
86. Id. at 39.
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ous matter, if, indeed, it applies to them at all."' 87 Moreover, "[s]ince
the rule has become functionally identified with the fourth amend-
ment,"'8 8 police doubts about the importance and applicability of
search and seizure standards "are likely to be stronger [if the rule is
abolished] than they would be if the . . . rule had never been im-
posed."' 89 Along the same lines, a more recent study reveals that "ad-
herence to the fourth amendment by individual officers [in this
instance, Chicago narcotics officers], and the institutional reforms
reinforcing that adherence, have been and are likely to remain tied to
the exclusionary rule." 90
On the basis of these studies, I think it fair to say that if an excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule were established for serious crimes, the
police (and, I think, the general public as well) would hear the follow-
ing message:
In routine criminal cases, we shall still take the fourth amendment seri-
ously, but in the big criminal cases we no longer will. In the big cases
the fourth amendment is too great an impediment in the war against
crime for law enforcement officials to endure. In the big cases, the police
have a license to proceed without worrying about respecting the right of
the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. Vio-
lating the fourth amendment is a lesser evil than letting murderers,
armed robbers, and other serious criminals go unpunished. The pursuit,
apprehension, and conviction of such criminals is too important to ex-
pect or to require the police and the courts to attend to the restraints of
the fourth amendment. 91
87. Id. at 30.
88. Id.
89. Id. See also Tiffany, Judicial Attempts to Control the Police, CURRENT HISTORY, July
1971, at 13, 52 ("It has been traditional when discussing the exclusionary rule to [ask]: Does the
rule work? But at this point that may be the wrong question. Instead, the central question may
now be this: how would police react if the Supreme Court overruled Mapp v. Ohio?").
90. Note, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics
Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1054 (1987). The study was based on extensive, structured
interviews with Chicago narcotics officers. When asked whether the exclusionary rule should be
kept as is, abolished, or modified by a "good faith" exception or in some other way, "all of the
officers responded that the rule should be preserved with a good faith exception. Many of them
remarked that the rule was necessary as a limit on police behavior." Id. at 1051. According to
one officer, "[i]f you abolished the exclusionary rule you would be turning the police department
loose.... That situation has enormous possibility for abuse." Id. According to another officer,
"[w]ithout the exclusionary rule, police investigating a murder or something would be like a
criminal released into the midst of society." Id. See also id. at 1052-54.
The author of this Note, Myron Orfield, informs me that it is part of a larger empirical study.
He observes:
Though the question was not specifically in my survey, I talked to 9 officers concerning the
question of whether they would take the fourth amendment seriously without the exclusion-
ary rule. Eight said they would not, one said that he would. The detailed responses are
repetitive of the ones [quoted in the published Note.]
Letter from Myron Orfield to Yale Kamisar (Nov. 20, 1987) (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) [hereinafter Orfield Letter].
91. Cf F. Allen, supra note 18, at 36 (footnotes omitted):
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There is another problem with withdrawing the exclusionary rule
in the most serious cases. This would prevent the rule's application in
the cases most likely to culminate in prosecutions and the cases in
which law enforcement officials are most likely to be concerned about
the admissibility of the evidence they gather - the very instances
when the rule is most likely to be effective. 92 "Since in the policeman's
hierarchy of values, arrest and subsequent conviction are more impor-
tant the 'bigger' the 'pinch,' compliance with the exclusionary rule
seems contingent upon this factor."' 93
2. Is a Short List of "Serious Crimes" Likely To Stay Short?
There is still another problem with a flat exception to the exclu-
sionary rule for "serious" or "most serious" crimes. You can draw up
a short list of such crimes, but can you keep it short? Professor
Kaplan lists "treason, espionage, murder, armed robbery and kidnap-
ping by organized groups. ' ' 94 But this list is too short to suit Justice
[Prior to Mapp v. Ohio] [s]ome states sought to avoid the heavy costs involved in complete
acceptance or rejection of the exclusionary rule by holding the rule applicable only to certain
categories of offenses. The consequences were predictable. The police, being of a pragmatic
turn, tended to interpret the withdrawal of the rule in given offense categories as a license to
proceed in those areas without legal restraint.
"Evidence of this," adds Professor Allen, "may be seen in the American Bar Foundation's Pilot
Studies [of criminal justice in the United States]." Id. at 36 n.184.
92. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 1.2(e), at 43.
93. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WiTHOuT TRIAL 228 (2d ed. 1975). Myron Orfield, author of the
recent study of Chicago narcotics officers described in note 90 supra, points out:
If there is one thing that the empirical evidence on the exclusionary rule bears out, it is the
realization that the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is closely related to the rule's effect
on important cases. If the case is important to the police and the police department, the rule
works very well. The smaller the case, the more trouble the police have in making the rule
work....
* Because of the loss of large numbers of cases in the 1960's, the Chicago police were
forced to respond to the exclusionary rule by developing a series of programs and proce-
dures designed to secure compliance with the fourth amendment .... The effectiveness of
these reforms however was largely confined to the big case, the case in which the police had
sufficient time to prepare in advance or in which they cared enough to spend time reviewing
the incident and/or reprimanding the officer. Even though in the last several years signifi-
cant progress has been made in deterring the small scale illegal search, because it does not
involve a serious crime or an important investment of time and because the loss of evidence
does not result in the loss of a big case, these types of violations are far more difficult to deter
by means of the exclusionary rule.
Orfield Letter, supra note 90.
Professor Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1047, assumes that "[i]n investigations of the most serious
offenses, unlike the ordinary instances of police invasion of the citizen's fourth amendment rights
in less serious cases, remedies other than the exclusionary rule may be effective." But "the re-
straint of potential adverse public opinion, which generally plays a small part with respect to
searches as compared to other forms of police illegality, is virtually nonexistent when the public
believes the police were directing their attention to those suspected of the most serious offenses."
I W. LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 1.2(e), at 44.
94. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1046.
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Cameron. He would add "such crimes as rape and arson."95 What
crimes other than rape and arson are such crimes as rape and arson?
Justice Cameron does not say. Presumably he has in mind such
crimes as "burglary in the first degree" 96 and "assault in the first de-
gree."'97 But why stop there?
When Justice Cameron plumps for a "serious crimes" exception to
the exclusionary rule on the ground that certain major crimes "always
will. . exceed the gravity of any Fourth Amendment violation" 98 -
one might say, always will be "dirtier business" than any fourth
amendment violation - I cannot help recalling what Brooklyn Dis-
trict Attorney Edward Silver, a leading proponent of law enforcement
wiretapping, argued a quarter of a century ago. At the time, all tap-
ping was prohibited by federal law (at least on paper).99 Protested
Silver: "There may be those who think wiretapping is a 'dirty busi-
ness,' but who will deny the fact that murderers, narcotics peddlers,
labor racketeers, and extortionists are engaged in far dirtierbusinesses?" 100
Note that in calling for a relaxation of restraints on police and
prosecutors, Mr. Silver ranked "narcotics peddlers" right behind mur-
derers. (More people, I think it fair to say, would do so today than in
Silver's day.) Note, too, that three of the four crimes Silver mentioned
appear on neither Kaplan's nor Cameron's short list.
But Silver's own list was not a long one. He did not seek authority
to use wiretapping as a general crime control measure, but, evidently,
only as a weapon to combat organized crime and offenses associated
95. State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 271; 689 P.2d 519, 530 (1984) (emphasis added); Cameron &
Lustiger, supra note 5, at 145 (emphasis added).
96. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.30 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1987) (defining "burglary
in the first degree" as knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling with intent to
commit a crime therein when the defendant or another participant in the crime, inter alia, "[i]s
armed with explosives or a deadly weapon" or "[clauses physical injury to any person who is not
a participant in the crime").
97. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1975) (defining "assault in the first
degree" as, inter alia, causing "serious physical injury to another person" with the intent to do
so, "by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument," or "with intent to disfigure an-
other person seriously and permanently," destroying, amputating, or disabling permanently a
member or organ of a person's body). This provision in effect retains the old crime of
"maiming."
98. 142 Ariz. at 271, 689 P.2d at 530. See also Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 145.
99. The Court so interpreted section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934. See
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939);
Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957). Sec-
tion 605 of the 1934 Act was displaced by the electronic surveillance provisions of the Crime
Control Act of 1968, often called Title III. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1982).
100. Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 MINN. L.
REV. 835, 854 (1960) (emphasis added). At the time he wrote this article, Mr. Silver was head of
the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys.
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with such crime. Nevertheless, he adopted a different stance than had
most of his allies in the battle to legalize tapping.
In the 1940s and 1950s most proponents of law enforcement tap-
ping had sought such authority, or at least had dwelt on the need for
such authority, only in cases of treason, espionage, sabotage, murder,
and kidnapping (a group of crimes very similar to Professor Kaplan's
"most serious cases") or, as they sometimes described it, only in case
of crimes endangering the nation's safety or jeopardizing human
life.101 Thus Attorney General Herbert Brownell told us that "various
proposals pending in Congress [to legalize wiretapping] seek to strike a
fair balance between the rights of the individual and society . . . in
specific cases involving the Nation's security and defense, as well as
kidnapping."' 1 2 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, "himself," the Attor-
ney General assured us, "opposes wire tapping as an investigative
function except in connection with crimes of the most serious charac-
ter, such as offenses endangering the safety of the nation or the lives of
human beings."' 0 3
The battle to legalize wiretapping raged for decades. During most
of this period, proponents of wiretapping sought permission to use this
extraordinary power only in a few select cases. However, when the
battle was finally resolved, federal officials had authority to use this
power against "a vast number of offenses' °4 (e.g., interstate gambling,
theft from interstate shipments, counterfeiting, and narcotics viola-
tions) and state officials possessed even broader authority to tap and
bug. 10 5 In short, when the smoke had cleared, law enforcement offi-
cials could resort to electronic surveillance "almost as freely as any
other standard investigative tool.' 0 6
I do not claim that if the Court were to uphold legislation "ex-
empting" a short list of crimes from the exclusionary rule that list
would eventually include virtually all the felonies to be found in a typi-
101. See the historical summaries of various proposals to legalize wiretapping in Brownell,
The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 199-200 (1954); Rogers, The Case
for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 794-97 (1954). At the time they wrote these articles, Her-
bert Brownell was Attorney General of the United States and William Rogers was Deputy Attor-
ney General.
102. Brownell, supra note 101, at 209.
103. Id. at 207-08.
104. H. Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and
Order," 67 MICH. L. REv. 455, 481 (1969) (describing Title III of the Crime Control Act of
1968). Section 2516 of Title III was recently amended to authorize electronic surveillance for
such crimes as the laundering of monetary instruments; fraud by wire, radio, or television; and
crimes relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts.
105. H. Schwartz, supra note 104, at 482.
106. Id.
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cal criminal code. I do maintain that the pressure to lengthen that
short list would be enormous and that what started out as an excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule for "the relatively small class of the most
serious cases"' 10 7 would likely end up as an exception for a rather size-
able class of cases.
"What dictates legislation," the Chief Reporter of the Model Penal
Code and a close student of the " 'politics' of crime" once observed,
"is the simple point of politics that reelection demands voting against
sin, whenever ballots on the question must be cast."' 0 8 And when leg-
islators start amending an exception to the exclusionary rule, no less
than when they start amending sentencing ranges, "they are voting
against sin.... Armed with emotion, intuition, pencil and paper, they
seek [legislation] that will function as symbolic denunciations of the
crimes to which they apply."'' 0 9
Is there any substantial doubt that if a "serious crimes" exception
to the exclusionary rule were adopted, that exception would soon in-
clude some drug offenses? It is worth noting that recently, when up-
holding the "preventive detention" provisions of the Bail Reform
Act," 0 the Court observed that the Act "carefully limits the circum-
stances under which detention may be sought to the most serious of
crimes,"'I' such as "crimes of violence" and "serious drug offenses. ""112
If, as seems probable, the legislature would soon expand an espio-
nage-murder-kidnapping exception to the exclusionary rule to include,
inter alia, drug trafficking, 1 3 the Court is not likely to offer much
107. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1046.
108. Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465,
473 (1961).
109. Zimring & Hawkins, Murder, the Model Code, and the Multiple Agendas of Reform, in
A CONFERENCE CELEBRATING THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE 267,
290 (Nov. 6, 1987) (discussing the amendment of sentencing provisions) (on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review).
110. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150, 3152-3156 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
111. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101 (1987) (emphasis added).
112. 107 S. Ct. at 2101 (emphasis added).
113. Theoretically one could exclude "nonvictim" crimes from the "serious crimes" cate-
gory, but few legislators, if any (or judges, for that matter), are likely to so belittle the sale of
cocaine or heroin. Nor should they. Cf Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1048-49 (discussion of whether
exclusionary rule should be applied more vigorously in nonvictim than in victim crimes):
There are, however, two major problems with dividing crimes into nonvictim and victim
categories. First, some nonvictim crimes, such as pornography, may cause great public in-
dignation. Second, although everyone can distinguish the seriousness of the most dangero s
crimes from the rest of criminal activity, it may be very difficult for courts rationally to
differentiate between at least some nonvictim crimes and fairly serious offenses with victims.
One generally might tend to regard nonvictim crime as I ss serious, but certain victimless
crimes such as sale of heroin may be quite dangerous.
Id. at 1049.
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resistance. As Professor Wayne LaFave has noted,14 the Court has
alluded to "the horrors of drug trafficking" 115 and underscored the
"compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly
drugs for personal profit."' 1 6 The Court has also expressed the view
that "the obstacles to detection of illegal [drug traffic] may be un-
matched in any other area of law enforcement. ' 17
Whether, once the basic notion was accepted, a "narrow excep-
tion" to the exclusionary rule for "serious offenses" would soon em-
brace at least a few drug offenses is a matter of some importance.
While "[a] growing body of [empirical] data . . . indicates that few
persons arrested are able to use the [exclusionary] rule to escape con-
viction,"' 1 8 the impact of the rule is greater for particular crimes, such
as felony drug offenses, "the prosecution of which depends heavily on
physical evidence."' " 9 Indeed, "[t]he most striking feature of the data
is the concentration of illegal searches in drug arrests (and possibly
weapons possession arrests) and the extremely small effects in arrests
for other offenses, including violent crimes."'' 20  For example, "[t]he
114. See LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain
View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1223-24
(1983). Professor LaFave voices concern that "the maleficent trafficking in drugs" may produce
"atrophy of the fourth amendment." Id. at 1224. See also Saltzburg, Another View of Illegal
Narcotics (As Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4, 23 (1986) (courts
have been "turning their backs" on fourth amendment principles "in order to aid the war against
illicit drugs").
115. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983).
116. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (quoting Powell, J.,
concurring in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980)).
117. 462 U.S. at 704 n.5 (again quoting Justice Powell's concurrence in Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 561-62).
118. Canon, Ideology and Reality in the Debate Over the Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative
Argument for its Retention, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 559, 560 (1982). Various empirical studies of the
impact of the exclusionary rule are discussed or summarized in the majority opinion in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6, in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, 468 U.S. at 950 n.l 1,
and in I W. LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 22 n.6.
119. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6.
120. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need To Learn) About the "Costs" of
the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND.
Ras. J. 611, 680. A study of suppression motions in nine mid-sized counties in three states also
found that the effects of illegal searches are concentrated in drug and weapons cases. Nardulli,
The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 585, 599 (Table 10).
Although the percentage of felony drug cases "lost" because of the exclusionary rule is not
high, it is much larger than the percentage of other felony cases "lost" because of the rule. See
text at notes 121-22 infra. According to statewide California data, prosecutors reject 2.4% of
felony drug arrests because of illegal searches. See Davies, supra, at 619. Elsewhere in his arti-
cle, Davies estimates, on the basis of available data, that "the cumulative loss of drug arrests at
all stages of felony processing in California is around 7.1%." Id. at 681. See also id. at 655. In
Leon, referring to Davies' article, the Court states that "the cumulative loss due to nonprosecu-
tion or nonconviction of individuals arrested on felony drug charges is probably in the range of
2.8% to 7.1%," 468 U.S. at 907 n.6. The Court may have taken the 2.8% figure from Nardulli,
supra. In Nardulli's study, motions to suppress were granted in 2.8% of the drug cases studied,
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statewide California data shows that less than 0.3% (fewer than 3 in
1000) of arrests for all nondrug offenses are rejected by prosecutors
because of illegal searches, and there are even smaller effects for the
most serious violent crimes."' 121
If a "serious crimes" exception to the exclusionary rule were lim-
ited, and remained limited, to the most serious violent crimes, its sig-
nificance would be largely symbolic. For the fourth amendment rarely
stymies law enforcement in this area. According to a recent five-year
study, for example, illegal search problems were given as the reason
for the rejection of only 117 of more than 68,000 robbery arrests, only
thirteen of more than 14,000 forcible rape arrests, and only eight of
approximately 12,000 homicide arrests. 122
But if, as I think would be the case, murder, forcible rape, and
armed robbery would function as "loss leaders" for drug offenses, at
least serious ones, 123 the exception to the exclusionary rule could no
longer be called a narrow one. It would do away with the exclusion-
ary rule where it has its greatest impact on the processing of felony
cases. (Of course, this may be why some opponents of the exclusion-
ary rule would like to see the notion of a "serious crimes" exception to
the rule win acceptance.)
This is still not the worst (or, depending upon one's viewpoint, the
best) that can be said for a "serious crimes" exception. As I shall
discuss in the next subsection, Justice Cameron's reasoning seems to
outrun his proposal. If one carries his reasoning to its ultimate con-
but in only 0.3% of cases involving offenses against persons and property. See Nardulli, supra, at
599.
121. Davies, supra note 120, at 619. See also Nardulli, supra note 120, at 599.
122. See Davies, supra note 120, at 640, 645. The impact of the exclusionary rule may be
negligible in robbery, rape, and homicide cases because fourth amendment problems rarely arise
in such cases or because the police take special pains to satisfy prescribed standards in such cases.
But to a considerable, but unknown, extent, the negligible effects of the exclusionary rule in these
types of cases may reflect the reluctance of judges'to grant the suppression motions of "serious
criminals." See Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1408 n.33 (1986).
123. There are many drug offenses. A goodly number carry light penalties, but some carry
extremely heavy ones. For example, under New York law there are seven degrees of "[c]riminal
possession of a controlled substance," N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.03, 220.05, 220.06, 220.09,
220.16, 220.18, 220.21 (McKinney 1980); five degrees of "[c]riminal sale of a controlled sub-
stance," N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.31, 220.34, 220.39, 220.41, 220.43 (McKinney 1980); and a
crime known as "[c]riminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds," N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 220.44 (Supp. 1987). "Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree,"
§ 220.43, and "[c]riminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree," § 220.21, are
class A-I felonies, punishable by not less than fifteen years nor more than twenty-five years im-
prisonment. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (3)(a)(i) (McKinney 1980). "Criminal sale of a con-
trolled substance in the second degree," § 220.41, and "[c]riminal possession of a controlled
substance in the second degree," § 220.18, are class A-II felonies, punishable by not less than
three years nor more than eight years and four months imprisonment. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.00 (3)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1987).
[Vol, 86:1
"Comparative Reprehensibility"
clusion, a "serious crimes" exception would not be limited to serious
crimes at all. The exception would almost completely engulf the rule.
3. Is Whether It Is Worse To Be Murdered or Raped Than To
Have One's House Searched Illegally the Right Question?
Justice Cameron favors a "serious case" exception to the exclu-
sionary rule "because, the rhetoric of some civil libertarians to the
contrary, it is worse to be murdered or raped than to have one's house
searched without a warrant, no matter how aggravated the latter vio-
lation." 124 If my own safety, comfort, and convenience were the only
interests at stake, I would not only agree with Justice Cameron but go
further. I would say it is worse to have my wife mugged, my children
sold drugs, or my office burglarized than to have my house searched
without a warrant or probable cause, no matter how gross the viola-
tion. Indeed, if the only relevant question were whether the crime
someone commits against me or my family or property is likely to be
more distressing than the police entering my house without a warrant
or probable cause, I would have to say that it would be worse to steal
my car or poison my dog.
Justice Cameron also favors this "serious case" exception (and a
general balancing test that weighs the gravity of the defendant's crime
against the magnitude of the officer's illegality) because then a defen-
dant will be "let off" only when he has "suffered more" from the po-
lice illegality involved in obtaining evidence against him than his
victims have suffered from the crimes he has perpetrated against
them. 125 (Presumably the victims of police lawlessness who turn out to
be innocent will not be before the court as criminal defendants.)
Even if we look only at crimes that cannot be called "serious" or
"most serious," when can it ever be said that a criminal whose fourth
amendment rights have been violated has "suffered more" than his
victims - the victims, say, of assault, burglary, theft by extortion, or
even theft by deception? Can it even be said that a credit card thief
whose fourth amendment rights have been violated has "suffered
more" from that violation than the person whose credit card he has
stolen and used?
In short, Justice Cameron's way of thinking about the exclusionary
124. Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 145 (emphasis in original).
125. See id. at 151:
[T]he balancing approach is also justified in terms of the fundamental fairness of its results.
The accused will be allowed to invoke the rule only where the illegality committed against
him is more grave than the crime he has committed against others. Thus, the accused will be
"let off" only where he has suffered more than his purported victims.
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rule takes us very far - very far away from exclusion. As various
search and seizure commentators have advised us, however, Justice
Cameron's way of thinking about the exclusionary rule is flawed.
"While the most immediate and direct consequence of exclusion
may be to benefit an individual defendant who might otherwise have
been convicted,"' 26 the goal of the exclusionary rule is "not to com-
pensate the defendant for the past wrong done to him any more than it
is to penalize the officer for the past wrong he has done.'127 Rather,
"[t]he defendant is at best an incidental beneficiary when exclusion
occurs for the purpose, as the Supreme Court stated in Stone v. Powell,
of 'removing the incentive' to disregard the Fourth Amendment so
that 'the frequency of future violations will decrease.' "128 Application
of the exclusionary rule sometimes means that an apparently guilty
defendant goes unpunished, but this occurs "to protect the rest of us
from unlawful police invasions of our security and to maintain the
integrity of our institutions. . . . The innocent and society are the
principal beneficiaries of the exclusionary rule."' 29
126. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 1.2(a), at 24.
127. Traynor, supra note 72, at 335.
128. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 40 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976)).
See also Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1396 (1983):
[The exclusionary rule] has been criticized for benefiting defendants in a manner often dis-
proportionate to the degree to which their fourth amendment rights were violated....
However, this disproportionality is significant only if one conceives the purpose of the rule
as compensation for the victim. Because I view the exclusionary rule as necessary to pre-
serve fourth amendment guarantees, I do not find this criticism persuasive.
129. Roger Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of
Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 330-31 (1973). See also Oaks, supra note 83, at 709-10 (quoted in
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556-57 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)):
The exclusionary rule is not aimed at special deterrence since it does not impose any direct
punishment on a law enforcement official who has broken the rule .... [It] is aimed at
affecting the wider audience of all law enforcement officials and society at large. It is meant
to discourage violations by individuals who have never experienced any sanction for them.
Consider, too, Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81
MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1266-67 (1983):
The exclusionary rule protects innocent people by eliminating the incentive to search and
seize unreasonably. So long as a policeman knows that any evidence he obtains in violation
of the fourth amendment will not help secure a conviction he has less reason to violate the
amendment and more reason to try to understand it .... [I]t defies logic to believe that a
policeman's willingness to search without probable cause or a warrant (and thereby possibly
subject an innocent person to an unjustifiable intrusion of privacy) is unrelated to whether
he can gain any admissible evidence from conducting the search.
See also Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregu-
lating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 390 (1981):
The probable cause requirement compels society to pay a cost in the apprehension of
criminals, or in the recovery of evidence of crime, for the sake of people's privacy. It is
surely legitimate for courts to suppress evidence if the lost evidence is counterbalanced by
greater security for our "persons, houses, papers, and effects," to the same extent as when, at
the same cost, the police comply with the mandate of the fourth amendment not to seize or
search without probable cause.
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Like any good advocate's wording of the question, Justice Cam-
eron's wording suggests the desired answer. But there are other ways
to frame the question. For example, is it better to let a few wicked
persons go free than to furnish the police an incentive to violate many
people's rights? Or, is it better to let an occasional criminal go unpun-
ished 30 than to encourage the police to go about their business with-
out regard to the fourth amendment, thus diminishing privacy and
freedom to a degree inconsistent with a free and open society?13' Or,
to borrow Justice Holmes' famous language, is it "a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ig-
noble part"? 32 Balancing expediency against values or principles is
not an endeavor that lends itself to cost-benefit analysis.133 It is not
unlike balancing one's need for a new car against "Thou shalt not
steal."134
But doesn't the fourth amendment have something to say about
expediency versus principle? I realize that the amendment has "both
the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity."1 35 But doesn't it
mean something? Is not its very purpose - and that of the Bill of
Rights generally - "to identify values that may not be sacrificed to
expediency"? 36 And to stand in the way when "the task of combating
crime and convicting the guilty ... seem of such critical and pressing
concern," as it will in every era, "that we may be lured by the tempta-
tions of expediency into forsaking our commitment to protecting indi-
130. When I say occasional criminal, I do mean occasional. As already pointed out, see text
at notes 121-22 supra, according to a recent study, less than three-tenths of one percent (0.3%) of
California arrests for non-drug offenses were rejected because of the exclusionary rule and only
seven-hundredths of one percent (0.07%) of homicide arrests. One may retort, as Justice White
did for the Court in Leon, that although many researchers have concluded that "the impact of
the exclusionary rule is insubstantial .... the small percentages with which they deal mask a
large absolute number of felons who are released because the cases against them were based in
part on illegal searches or seizures." 468 U.S. at 908 n.6. But "raw numbers are not as useful for
policy evaluation as percentages. In a system as large as the American criminal justice system, in
which there were 10 million felony and misdemeanor arrests in 1979, almost any nationwide
measurement or estimate will look large if expressed in raw numbers." Davies, supra note 120, at
670 (footnote omitted).
131. Cf Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 403
(1974).
132. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
133. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 194-200 (1978); Kamisar, supra note 1,
at 646-50; A. Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law
57 WASH. L. REV. 647, 656-63 (1982); Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 36, at 87-89; Wasser-
strom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 316-18 (1984);
J.B. White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1281-83
(1983).
134. Cf Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1440 (1962).
135. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42 (1966).
136. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 980 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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vidual liberty and privacy"? 137
IV. DOES A COURT THAT EXCLUDES UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE To AVOID CONDONING POLICE
LAWLESSNESS BY THE SAME TOKEN CONDONE
THE DEFENDANT'S LAWLESSNESS?
There remains to be considered what might be called the culmina-
tion of the "comparative reprehensibility" approach - virtual aboli-
tion of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule (but not the back-up
due process "shock the conscience" test). As I read Professor Barrett,
one of the most forceful and persuasive critics of the exclusionary rule,
this is the position he advocates, at least by implication.1 38 Therefore I
shall spell out the "comparative reprehensibility" argument for abol-
ishing the exclusionary rule by using, and reworking, his language:
The judge who is confronted with unconstitutionally obtained, but co-
gent, evidence of guilt faces a dilemma. If he excludes the evidence "to
avoid condoning the acts of the officer" he only winds up "condoning the
illegal acts of the defendant." Whichever way he turns, he permits the
"consummation" of somebody's "illegal scheme" - either the police of-
ficer's (if he admits the evidence) or the defendant's (if he excludes it).
But why resolve the dilemma in favor of the defendant? The judge need
not and should not do so except when - and this would rarely if ever be
the case - the officer's misconduct is plainly more, or "much more,"
reprehensible than the defendant's.' 39 It is hard to conceive of a case
where the police illegality would be "so much more reprehensible" than,
say, a drug dealer's or a burglar's or an extortionist's that the judge's
duty would be to reject the evidence and free the defendant. (If such a
case were to arise the police misconduct would be "shocking" and the
Rochin due process test would afford the defendant ample protection.)140
This argument has a certain allure. It makes, or ought to make, pro-
ponents of the exclusionary rule reexamine basic premises. But I shall
not leave the reader in suspense. I do not find the argument
persuasive.
When courts admit unconstitutionally seized evidence I do believe
it is likely that significant numbers of police officers, as well as large
137. Leon, 468 U.S. at 929-30 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
138. See the lengthy quotation from Barrett in the text at note 9 supra.
139. Thus Professor Barrett asks, text at note 9 supra, "Can we assume from any general
social point of view that the policeman's conduct is so much more reprehensible than the defen-
dant's that the duty of the judge is to reject the evidence and free the defendant?"
140. In short, where Professor Kaplan would admit unconstitutionally seized evidence in all
serious cases except when the violation of the defendant's rights was so shocking as to invoke
Rochin, see note 4 supra, Professor Barrett, at least by implication, would admit unconstitution-
ally seized evidence in virtually all cases except where the defendant could avail himself of
Rochin.
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segments of the public, will regard the official lawlessness as "not so
bad," else the courts would not have permitted the evidence to be
used. Until recently, there was only anecdotal evidence to support this
view.141 Thus, one officer at the time of Mapp insisted that his prior
unconstitutional conduct had been proper because the courts of his
state had accepted the evidence - had "okayed" what he had done. 142
And at least two of the nation's leading police chiefs, William Parker
of Los Angeles and Michael Murphy of New York, had viewed the
exclusionary rule (which, of course, has nothing to say about the con-
tent of the law governing the police) as imposing new substantive re-
strictions on searches and seizures 143 - "dramatic testimony to the
hollowness of the Fourth Amendment in the absence of the rule." 144
But now we have something more substantial than scattered anec-
dotal evidence. A recent study of the attitudes of New York police
toward the exclusionary rule145 found
strong evidence that, regardless of the effectiveness of direct sanctions,
police officers could neither understand nor respect a Court which pur-
ported to impose constitutional standards on the police without exclud-
ing evidence obtained in violation of those standards.
* When the Mapp decision imposed the exclusionary rule on [New
York and other states whose courts admitted evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment], the police were confused because they
had never been made aware of the constitutional standards for searching.
However, once the police realized what had happened, they assumed
that the exclusionary rule was an absolute necessity. Indeed, most police
officers interpret the Wolf case as not having imposed any legal obliga-
tion on the police since, under that decision, the evidence would still be
admissible no matter how it was obtained.
No matter what sanctions may be imposed in its stead, police
officers are bound to view the elimination of the exclusionary rule as an
indication that the fourth amendment is not a serious matter, if indeed it
applies to them at all.
* Since the rule has become functionally identified with the fourth
amendment, the removal of the rule is likely to be interpreted as an im-
plicit condoning of violations of the fourth and fourteenth amendments,
141. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 954 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Davies, supra note 120, at 629-
30 & n. 112; Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49
CORNELL L.Q. 436, 440-46 (1964); Stewart, supra note 128, at 1386.
142. See Kamisar, supra note 141, at 442-43.
143. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 954 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Davies, supra note 120, at 629-
30. See also Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 72-73 (1978).
144. Davies, supra note 120, at 630 n.112.
145. Loewenthal, supra note 85. For a description of the study, see note 85 supra.
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no matter what substitute remedies may be applied.146
On the other hand, I find it difficult to believe that the exclusion of
evidence in a robbery or burglary or narcotics case could convey a
comparable message to the police and the public that robbery or bur-
glary or drug trafficking is "not so bad." I can readily see how the
judicial reception of unconstitutionally acquired evidence may foster
police misconduct, for the exclusionary rule is a "disincentive" - it
removes a significant incentive for making unconstitutional searches,
at least where the police contemplate prosecution and conviction.
Thus, no matter whether and to what extent the exclusionary rule "de-
ters" police illegality, abolishing the rule, as Professor Phillip Johnson
has observed, "would positively encourage" such illegality. 147 But it is
146. Id. at 29-30. Although a very recent study of Chicago narcotics officers did not focus
primarily on police attitudes toward the exclusionary rule, its findings are consistent with Profes-
sor Loewenthal's study. See note 90 supra.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (overruled twelve years later by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961)), held that "[tihe security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police"
was "enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause," 338 U.S. at 27-28, but that
the exclusionary rule was not "an essential ingredient of the right." 338 U.S. at 29. Thus, those
convicted on the basis of evidence obtained in violation of that right, "together with those who
emerge scatheless from a search," were "remand[ed]" to "the remedies of private action and such
protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may
afford." 338 U.S. at 31.
There is some anecdotal evidence confirming Professor Loewenthal's findings that the New
York police did not view Wolf as imposing any legal obligation on them and "had never been
made aware of the constitutional standards for searching" until Wolf was overruled. Loewen-
thai, supra note 85, at 29. Some years after Mapp, Leonard Reisman, the former New York City
Deputy Police Commissioner in charge of legal matters, explained why New York officers had
not been instructed in the law of search and seizure during the reign of Wolft "Although the
U.S. Constitution requires warrants in most cases, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled [in Wolf]
that evidence obtained without a warrant - illegally if you will - was admissible in state courts.
So the feeling was, why bother?" Quoted in Stewart, supra note 128, at 1386.
Evidently the police were not the only New York law enforcement officials unfamiliar with
and uninterested in the law of search and seizure prior to Mapp. Professor Richard Uviller, a
state prosecuting attorney at the time Mapp was handed down, recalls:
I cranked out a crude summary of federal search and seizure and suppression law just before
the State District Attorney's Association convened .... I had an instant runaway best
seller. It was as though we had made a belated discovery that the fourth amendment applied
in the State of New York ....
Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution: Some Constitutional Premises and
Practices in Transition, 35 VAND. L. REV. 501, 502 (1982).
147. Johnson, New Approaches to Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 4 (Working paper, Sept.
1978) (emphasis in the original).
As I have suggested elsewhere, see Kamisar, supra note 1, at 597 n.204, 661-62, despite its
popularity in judicial opinions and the legal literature, there is a good deal to be said for remov-
ing the term "deterrence" from the search and seizure vocabulary altogether:
"Deterrence" suggests that the exclusionary rule is supposed to influence the police the way
the criminal law is supposed to affect the general public. But the rule does not, and cannot
be expected to, "deter" the police the way the criminal law is supposed to work. The rule
does not inflict a "punishment" on police who violate the fourth amendment; exclusion of
the evidence does not leave the police in a worse position than if they had never violated the
Constitution in the first place. Because the police are members of a structural governmental
entity, however, the rule influences them, or is supposed to influence them, by "systemic
deterrence," i.e., through a department's institutional compliance with fourth amendment
standards.
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not easy (for me, at any rate) to see how the exclusion of evidence in a
particular kidnapping or counterfeiting or narcotics case could operate
to promote future acts of kidnapping, counterfeiting, or dope peddling.
To be sure, the exclusionary rule is not the only imaginable way to
demonstrate to the police and the public alike that we take the fourth
amendment seriously. There is not, and for many years there has not
been, a shortage of theoretically possible ways to give the amendment
real meaning. (I have heard a good deal about them in each of the
dozens of exclusionary rule debates and panel discussions I have par-
ticipated in over the past thirty years, but I have yet to see them in
operation.) As the late Justice Potter Stewart concluded, after exam-
ining the various presently available alternatives to the exclusionary
rule:
They punish and perhaps deter the grossest of violations, as well as gov-
ernmental policies that legitimate these violations. They compensate
some of the victims of the most egregious violations. But they do little, if
anything, to reduce the likelihood of the vast majority of fourth amend-
ment violations - the frequent infringements motivated by commend-
able zeal, not condemnable malice. For those violations, a remedy is
required that inspires the police officer to channel his enthusiasm to ap-
prehend a criminal toward the need to comply with the dictates of the
fourth amendment. There is only one such remedy - the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence.148
Id. at 597 n.204. Although "systemic deterrence" is a definite improvement over such terms as
"deterrence" or" 'deterrent' effects," it seems more useful to call the rule a "disincentive" or, as
Professor Anthony Amsterdam does, "a counterweight within the criminal justice system that
prevents the system from functioning as an unmitigated inducement to policemen to violate the
fourth amendment." Amsterdam, supra note 131, at 431.
148. Stewart, supra note 128, at 1388-89. Adds Stewart, id. at 1389 (emphasis in original)
(footnotes omitted): "Thus, although I did not join in the Court's opinion in the Mapp case -
because it decided an issue that was not before the Court - I agree with its conclusion that the
exclusionary rule is necessary to keep the right of privacy secured by the fourth amendment from
.remain[ing] an empty promise.'"
The adequacies (or inadequacies) of alternatives to the exclusionary rule have been the sub-
ject of a vast literature. The general consensus is that civil suits, criminal prosecution, injunc-
tions, review boards, and internal police discipline are sadly ineffective. A tort action against the
offending police or the government entities that employ them seems the most promising alterna-
tive to the exclusionary rule. But
potential tort plaintiffs are likely to be unaware of their rights, unable to afford a lawyer, and
afraid of retribution if they sue the police.... Moreover, juries are likely to be unsympa-
thetic to their claims, for those who are most likely to be victimized by police misconduct
belong in disproportionate numbers to insular and unpopular minority groups.
Wasserstrom, supra note 133, at 292 n.187. Moreover, "[a]ny damages remedy for fourth
amendment violations is bound to be ineffective as a deterrent because of the difficulty of valuing
the impairment of the interests which the fourth amendment is designed to protect." Schlag,
Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 909 (1982). Establishing a minimum level of damages
is not likely to work because of political and practical considerations. Five hundred or even
$1,000 in minimum damages is clearly not a sufficient quantity to induce a client or his
lawyer to institute suit, incur expenses, and draw the wrath of the police department.... On
the other hand, if the minimum scheduled damages are too high, the proposal will be politi-
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So long as the exclusionary rule remains the only presently avail-
able meaningful sanction or counterweight against unconstitutional
searches or seizures 149 - so long as "such limits as there are on [po-
lice powers to search and seize] are ...both defined and enforced
almost exclusively in exclusionary rule litigation"'150 - I think it may
fairly be said that abolition of the rule and the court's use of unconsti-
tutionally obtained evidence would condone, or would likely be viewed
as condoning, the underlying police lawlessness.
Surely, however, violating the fourth amendment is not the only
effective way or the only feasible means presently available to bring a
private malefactor to justice. We need not look at Wayne LaFave's
treatise. (He advises us that the "costs" of the exclusionary rule are
"much lower ... than is commonly assumed.")' 5' Nor need we ex-
amine Thomas Davies' long article on the subject, "the most careful
and balanced assessment of all available empirical data."' 152 (Davies
informs us that the evidence "consistently indicates that the general
cally unacceptable to Congress [or a state legislature] because it will allow the filing of spuri-
ous suits simply for the settlement value.
Id. at 910 n.126.
Although the Court has recently ruled that "municipalities do not enjoy the same good-faith
immunity afforded to individual police officers" a local governmental body may be held liable
only when its policies give rise to the constitutional violation. Since most fourth amendment
violations are the result of wrongful actions by individual law enforcement officials, not of
unlawful governmental policies, the circumstances under which a governmental body will be
held liable for a fourth amendment violation are likely to be rare, indeed.
Stewart, supra, at 1388 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
The classic article on the general subject is Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955). See also, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 131, at
429-30; Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives,
1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 621; Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the
Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1981); Schlag, supra, at 907-13; Project, Suing the Police
in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781 (1979).
149. As Professor Silas Wasserstrom has noted, Wasserstrom, supra note 133, at 293 n. 187
(quoting Judge Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 49, 62, 68):
Even those who think tort remedies could be made to work as an effective deterrent, and
that rationalized tort remedies should replace the exclusionary rule, admit that there are
substantial difficulties in "formulating tort remedies that will deter violations of the Fourth
Amendment effectively," .... and that important changes in existing doctrines are required if
those remedies are to be effective.
150. Wasserstrom, supra note 133, at 293-94.
151. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 1.2(a), at 22. I put the "costs" of the rule in quotation
marks because, along with many other commentators, I believe that when we talk about costs we
are really talking about the costs of the fourth amendment itself. The costs said to be exacted by
the exclusionary rule "would also be exacted by any other means of eliminating significant incen-
tives for making illegal searches - by any other means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment that
worked." Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of
the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT
1961-1986, at 143, 163 (H. Schwartz ed. 1987). See generally text at notes 207-15 infra.
152. Professor LaFave so describes the Davies article, LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expe-
diency'" United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895, 904.
I share his view.
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level of the rule's effects on criminal prosecutions is marginal at
most. ")153 If we want to find out whether "apprehension and punish-
ment [have been] pursued and inflicted with sufficient determination"
in the exclusionary rule age "that a would-be law violator must count
them as substantial risks," 154 we need only read our morning newspa-
pers. The following items should suffice:
New Prisoners Are Barred by Crowded Texas Prisons: The belea-
guered Texas prison system today was forced to temporarily stop admit-
ting new prisoners after its population crept above levels mandated by a
federal court order.
There are now 32 different states ... under court order because of
overcrowding or related problems. Ten others are in the midst of
litigation....
From 1977 to 1985 the population of the nation's state and federal
prisons rose 68 percent to a record 503,601, and the result has been se-
vere overcrowding nationwide, officials say.' 55
Michigan Prison Populace Rises 16.8%: The U.S. prison population
increased 8.6 percent in 1986, and the number of inmates reached an all-
time high of more than a half million [546,659, to be precise], the Justice
Department reported Sunday. Michigan was cited as recording one of
the largest increases.
In a report, the department's Bureau of Justice Statistics also said
that last year state prisons were operating at between 127 percent and
159 percent of their capacity.156
There Can Never Be Enough Prisons (Editorial): Having just spent
$657 million in a dramatic expansion of prisons, New York State faces a
rising crisis: not enough prison space....
The population runup began in the 1970's when there were about
13,000 prisoners. Construction in the 1980's brought capacity to 36,304.
Even that wasn't enough. Today the prison population exceeds 39,000,
and officials have been staring at a projected overflow of 2,000.157
One may retort: These news items do not focus on particular
crimes and criminals. At most they only confirm that "illegal searches
very rarely happen in nondrug arrests."'' 58 They tell us nothing specif-
153. Davies, supra note 120, at 622 (emphasis in the original). See also notes 120-21 & 130
supra, and accompanying text.
154. Cf L.B. Schwartz, On Current Proposals To Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
157, 158 (1954) ("A penal system gives us about all we can get out of it if apprehension and
punishment are pursued and inflicted with sufficient determination that a would-be law violator
must count them as substantial risks.").
155. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1987, at 1, col. I (natl. ed.).
156. Detroit Free Press, May 11, 1987, at IA, col. 3.
157. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1987, at 22, col. I (natl. ed.).
158. Davies, supra note 120, at 622-23 (emphasis added).
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ically about the extent to which the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule has impaired the effort to put drug offenders behind bars. Permit
me to quote one more news item:
War on Drugs Puts Strain on Prisons, U.S. Officials Say. The national
effort against the illegal use of drugs has sent a new wave of offenders
into the federal prisons, overwhelming facilities that are already
crowded, Justice Department officials say.
As a result, the Federal Government needs to more than double its
prison capacity to prevent an intolerable backup in the criminal justice
system, department officials concluded at a meeting this week.
The federal prison system, with the capacity to hold 28,000 prison-
ers, now has 44,000. Just six years ago the federal prisons held 26,000
inmates ....
Last year 37 percent of the people sentenced to federal prisons had
been arrested on drug charges, as against 25 percent in 1980 and 17 per-
cent in 1970. Officials estimate that by the end of the decade half the
new prisoners will have been arrested on drug offenses. 15 9
So long as many lawful means are available to combat crime (in-
cluding drug offenses) and to convict criminals (including drug deal-
ers), 160 how can it be seriously maintained that excluding the fruits of
official illegality in a particular case condones the "private lawless-
ness" involved in that case?
Two additional points need to be made. In the first place, Profes-
sor Barrett's argument (or suggested argument) that the court that
excludes illegally obtained evidence to avoid condoning the acts of the
transgressing officer only succeeds in condoning the illegal acts of the
defendant was made in a different era - six years before Mapp and at
a time when the states were free to admit unconstitutionally obtained
evidence (as many of them did).' 6 ' As the late Justice Stewart recently
pointed out, however,
the exclusionary rule is now part of our legal culture. Realistic apprais-
als of the effectiveness of the rule must, therefore, take into account the
inevitable misperceptions that will arise in the minds of many that "re-
pealing the rule" would signal a weakening of our resolve to enforce the
dictates of the fourth amendment. 162
159. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (natl. ed.).
160. Cf Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 419 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
161. But the California Supreme Court had just overturned its long-standing rule permitting
the use of illegally seized evidence. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (Tray-
nor, J.). Although Barrett "launched a powerful attack against the exclusionary rule, advancing
arguments that many critics of the rule have used since," Kamisar, supra note 8, at 194, he also
"articulated some of the justifications for the Cahan decision better than any of its proponents."
Id. at 193 (emphasis in original).
162. Stewart, supra note 128, at 1386. See also Loewenthal, supra note 85, at 30 ("Since the
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Secondly, assuming arguendo that thirty years ago, when Barrett
commented on California's adoption of the exclusionary rule on its
own initiative,1 63 the police were hemmed in at many turns (at least
theoretically) by unrealistic and out-of date substantive search and
seizure rules, it is hard to see how anyone can so describe the law of
search and seizure today. For, as I have noted elsewhere -
Not only has the Court weakened the remedies for proven violations of
the fourth amendment, but it has also - and how one puts this depends
on one's viewpoint - (a) significantly lightened the heavy burden that
the fourth amendment once imposed on police officers who want to pro-
ceed lawfully or (b) substantially diminished the security against unrea-
sonable search and seizure guaranteed by the fourth amendment.' 64
Two and a half decades ago, Barrett urged the Court to replace the
then monolithic "probable cause" standard with a more flexible "rea-
sonableness" approach for "[tihe result of this [then existing] all-or-
nothing approach is to place too little restraint on some investigative
techniques and too great restraint on others."'165 And he maintained
specifically that "reasonable latitude" must be given for such investi-
gative techniques as stopping and questioning suspicious persons on
the street.166
The Court has gone a long way in the direction Barrett sought.
Not only did it uphold "stops" and "frisks" on less than traditional
probable cause in Terry v. Ohio, 167 but in recent years it has expanded
Terry well beyond its facts. 168 And it now calls the need to "balance
the nature and quality of the [police] intrusion.., against the impor-
[exclusionary] rule has become functionally identified with the fourth amendment," "police
doubts [that the amendment is to be taken seriously] are likely to be stronger [if the rule were
abolished than] if the exclusionary rule had never been imposed."). Consider, too, notes 89-90
supra.
163. See generally Kamisar, supra note 8 (citing Barrett, supra note 9).
164. Id. at 198. A critic of the exclusionary rule might say that this was to be expected,
because the rule puts strong pressure on the courts to water down the rules governing arrest,
search, and seizure. I cannot improve on the late Monrad Paulsen's response, Paulsen, The
Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
255, 256 (1961) (emphasis added):
Whenever the rules are enforced by meaningful sanctions, our attention is drawn to their
content. The comfort of Freedom's words spoken in the abstract is always disturbed by
their application to a contested instance. Any rule of police regulation enforced in fact will
generate pressure to weaken the rule.
165. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. Cr.
REV. 46, 59.
166. Id. at 58.
167. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692
(1981). For criticism of this important development, see Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and
the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 551, 594-624 (1984); Wasserstrom, supra
note 133, at 355-74.
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tance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion"'' 69
"the key principle of the Fourth Amendment."' 70
Even when traditional probable cause is still required, the Court
has made it fairly clear, I think, that something less than "more-prob-
able-than-not" suffices (although how much less is anything but
clear).17 ' Indeed, at one point in its opinion in Illinois v. Gates, 172
which emphasized that probable cause is "a practical, common-sense
decision,"' 73 a "fluid concept.., not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules,"' 174 the Court informed us that "probable
cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity." 175
Any commentary, however summary, on the Court's performance
in the search and seizure field for the past twenty years should take
into account its treatment of the Carroll doctrine, 176 often called the
"automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement.' 77 As un-
derstood originally and for most of its life, the Carroll doctrine permit-
ted the police to search a car without a warrant on the basis of both
probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of crime and the
presence of exigent circumstances making it impractical to obtain a
warrant.' 78 But in the 1970s the Court virtually eliminated the exigent
169. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 703).
170. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 219 (1978) (White, J., concurring)).
171. See Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV.
551, 558-89 & n.250 (1984).
172. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
173. 462 U.S. at 238.
174. 462 U.S. at 232.
175. 462 U.S. at 244 n.13 (emphasis added). For the view that "[flair probability can only
mean 'some possibility,' which, in turn, translates to 'reason to suspect,' " see Wasserstrom,
supra note 133, at 338. Gates has been widely criticized. See Kamisar, supra note 171; LaFave,
supra note 114, at 1186-99; Loewy, Protecting Citizens from Cops and Crooks: An Assessment of
the Supreme Court's Interpretations of the Fourth Amendment During the 1982 Term, 62 N.C. L.
REv. 329, 336-45 (1984); Wasserstrom, supra note 133, at 274-75, 329-40. Cf. Moylan, Illinois v.
Gates: What It Did and Did Not Do, 20 CRiM. L. BULL. 93 (1984). But the decision has also
been ably defended. See Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of
Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465 (1984).
The relationship between Gates and Leon (see note 6 supra and text at notes 52-58 supra) is
unclear. Because the question had not been briefed or argued in Leon, the Court declined to
consider whether probable cause existed under the relaxed standard announced a year earlier in
Gates and thus shed little light on the extent to which the so-called good faith exception furnishes
the police greater leeway than that already provided by Gates. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 958-59
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). See also Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906,
912 (1986).
176. The genesis of this doctrine was Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
177. The use of this term is criticized in Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and
What It Is Not - A Rationale in Search ofa Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987, 1012-15
(1976).
178. See generally id.
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circumstances requirement. 79 Thus, although such an approach had
once been stoutly resisted, 80 the word "automobile" has become a
"talisman in whose presence the [search warrant requirement] fades
away and disappears."' 8'1
In the 1970s the Court also narrowed the protection against unrea-
sonable search and seizure in another important respect - by taking a
relaxed view of what constitutes a consent to an otherwise impermissi-
ble search or seizure. "Consent" is the "trump card" in the law of
search and seizure. For it is "[t]he easiest, most propitious way for the
police to avoid the myriad problems presented by the Fourth Amend-
ment."' 8 2 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 183 the Court made it easy (in
my judgment, too easy). The Court told us that a suspect may effec-
tively consent to a search even though she was never informed - and
the government has failed to demonstrate that she was aware - that
she had the right to refuse the officer's request. In short, a person can
lose her protection against unreasonable search and seizure through
ignorance or confusion; her rights are preserved only from loss through
coercion.
Although the Court has taken an expansive view of what consti-
tutes "consent," it has taken a grudging view of what constitutes a
"search" or "seizure." According to the Court, a depositor who
reveals her affairs to a bank "assumes the risk" that they will be con-
veyed to the government. Thus she has no legitimate expectation of
privacy as to the checks and deposit slips she exposes to bank employ-
179. See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583
(1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). For strong criticism of this development, see
Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603
(1982); L. Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557 (1982); Moylan, supra note 177. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982), further extended the Carroll doctrine, using it to sustain the warrantless search of a
"movable container" found in a locked car trunk.
180. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971) (plurality opinion).
181. 403 U.S. at 461. Moreover, even though the police lack any belief that a car contains
contraband or other evidence of crime, if they have adequate grounds to make a lawful custodial
arrest, they may conduct a warrantless search of the entire passenger compartment of the car
including closed containers found within that zone, even if the occupant is handcuffed and stand-
ing outside the car. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Furthermore, if they proceed on
an inventory search theory (I e., if pursuant to routine "community caretaking functions" they
itemize property in an impounded car or one otherwise in their lawful custody), the police need
neither a search warrant nor probable cause to search the vehicle or to arrest anyone. South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). Cf Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (police
may go through person's shoulder bag during an at-the-station inventory of his effects following
his arrest for disturbing the peace).
182. Zion, A Decade of Constitutional Revision, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1979, § 6 (Magazine),
at 26, 106. See also 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 8.1; Duke, supra note 122, at 1417.
183. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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ees in the ordinary course of business.'8 4 Similarly, because, we are
told, one who uses the phone "assumes the risk" that the telephone
company will reveal the numbers she dialed to the police, the govern-
ment's use of a pen register (a device that records all numbers dialed
from a given phone and the times they were dialed, but does not over-
hear oral communications) is not a "search" or "seizure" either.'8 5
Continuing further down this path, the monitoring of a suspect for
many miles by means of a "beeper" (an electronic tracking device)
until the suspect's car is stopped at a certain cabin in a secluded area,
the Court has informed us, is neither a "search" nor a "seizure."' 86
Nor is that all. Although one takes sufficient precautions (for ex-
ample, erects a fence, posts warning signs) to render entry on his pri-
vate land a criminal trespass under state law, his efforts will be of no
avail if the land is beyond the curtilage and the police enter on and
examine it.187 Moreover, even land admittedly within the curtilage
(for example, a fenced-in backyard) may not be subject to fourth
amendment protection. Thus, the Court recently informed a mari-
juana-growing defendant that the Constitution failed to protect him
against police aerial surveillance because, despite the fact he had com-
pletely enclosed his backyard with two high fences, he had "knowingly
exposed" his yard to the public.1 88
For the reasons indicated above, the police have ample room to
maneuver under the fourth amendment today, certainly a great deal
more flexibility than they had when the California Supreme Court
handed down Cahan or when the United States Supreme Court de-
cided Mapp. There might have been a time, say, twenty or thirty years
ago when they were first entering the world of the exclusionary rule,
that the police, plagued by out-of-date, ill-defined or yet unarticulated
rules governing their conduct, could not comply with the fourth
184. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
185. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
186. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). But cf. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984) (monitoring a beeper in a private residence not open to visual surveillance does violate
the fourth amendment).
The Miller-Smith-Knotts line of cases is criticized at length in 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 36,
§ 2.7, at 503-38.
187. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (expansively reading the "open fields" ex-
ception to fourth amendment restraints). See also United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987)
(taking into account various factors, barn was not within the curtilage). The Court's application
(or misapplication) of the "open fields" doctrine is criticized in Saltzburg, supra note 114.
188. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). See also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227 (1986) (aerial photography of industrial manufacturing complex not fourth amend-
ment "search"). Ciraolo and Dow are criticized extensively in LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of
Obsta Principiis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. L. REv. 291, 295-308 (1986).
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amendment and still do an effective job of law enforcement. There is
hardly cause for such concern today.
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
I began this article by calling attention to Judge Bork's com-
ment' 89 that "the conscience of the court ought to be at least equally
shaken" by the idea of excluding reliable, albeit unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence, thereby "turning a criminal loose upon society" (or to
use Barrett's language, thereby "permitting the consummation of the
defendant's illegal scheme") 190 as by the idea of admitting unconstitu-
tionally acquired evidence, thereby "soil[ing] their hands" (or to use
Barrett's language, thereby "permitting the consummation of [the] po-
liceman's illegal scheme"). 19' I think not.
Not at least when there is no presently available meaningful alter-
native to the exclusionary rule. Not when there is no necessity to re-
sort to unconstitutional methods in order to check crime or to convict
criminals. Not when the lawful avenues open to the pursuers of
criminals appear to be a good deal wider today than ever before.
I wince when I hear a law enforcement official protest: "We [the
police] are forced to fight by Marquis of Queensberry rules while the
criminals are permitted to gouge and bite."' 92 If criminals didn't
gouge and bite they wouldn't be criminals. And if police officers did
gouge and bite they wouldn't be (or at least shouldn't be) police
officers. 193
Moreover, the "Marquis of Queensberry rules" have been relaxed
a good deal in the last twenty years. 194 For example, it should be no
great feat for a police officer to satisfy a "probable cause" standard
that "requires only a fair probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity."' 95 Nor should it be difficult for a prosecutor to prevail now
189. See text at note 2 supra.
190. See text at note 9 supra.
191. Id.
192. Former New York City Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy, quoted in Kamisar,
When the Cops Were Not "Handcuffed," in CRIME & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 46, 47 (D. Cressey ed.
1971).
193. In an era when plagiarism is not unknown, I hasten to add that I seem to remember
someone saying something like this, but I cannot remember who.
194. See text at notes 164-88 supra.
195. See note 175 supra and accompanying text. Gates was a search warrant case and some
of the reasons the Court gave for abandoning the existing probable cause structure in favor of a
less demanding "totality of the circumstances" test apply only to warrant cases. But most of the
reasons "have equal force in the without-warrant setting as well" and thus "the chances are that
Gates will receive unquestioned acceptance as a probable cause benchmark even when the police
have acted without a warrant." 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 551. See also Kamisar, supra
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that the question presented, when the admissibility of physical evi-
dence is challenged, is "whether a reasonably well-trained officer
would have known that the search was illegal."1 96
Justice Cameron protests that "one of the main defects of the [ex-
clusionary] rule is that by the very action of focusing upon the rule
rather than the evidence, guilt becomes immaterial."' t97 But what is
the alternative? A criminal justice system where police illegality in
obtaining evidence of guilt "becomes immaterial"? A system where
the constitutionality of a search or seizure could not be challenged at
any stage of the criminal process?
"The survival of our system of criminal justice and the values
which it advances," a distinguished Attorney General's Committee
observed twenty-five years ago, "depends upon a constant, searching,
and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of author-
ity at all stages of the process."' 198 It is plain that the Committee
meant the criminal process. Why should official decisions and asser-
tions of authority with respect to searches and seizures be an
exception?
Moreover, and more fundamentally, why blame search and seizure
restraints on the exclusionary rule? To be sure, if there were no exclu-
sionary rule, unconstitutionally obtained, but "perfectly valid, good
and material evidence" would not be suppressed.' 99 But if the fourth
amendment were enforced by meaningful sanctions other than the ex-
clusionary rule, the same "perfectly valid, good and material evi-
dence" would not be offered to the court. It would not have been
unconstitutionally obtained in the first place.
note 171, at 581-84; Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 133, at 125; Wasserstrom, supra note
133, at 339 n.425.
196. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. Leon was a search warrant case and arguably
the "reasonable good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule adopted in that case will be lim-
ited to the warrant setting. There is a good deal to be said for doing so, and some language in
Leon supports this limited reading of the case, See Dripps, supra note 175, at 944-48; LaFave,
supra note 152, at 927-29. But Leon must be read against the backdrop of the previous ten years,
which saw the Court become increasingly hostile to the exclusionary rule and voice growing
doubts that "the extreme sanction of exclusion," as the Court twice called it in Leon, 468 U.S. at
916, 926, can "pay its way" in any setting, let alone one in which fourth amendment violations
are neither deliberate nor substantial. I find it hard to believe that, after many years of talk about
a "good faith" or "reasonable mistake" exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court would
finally adopt such an exception only to limit it to the small percentage of searches conducted
pursuant to warrants. See Kamisar, supra note 151, at 164-65. See also Kamisar, supra note 53,
at 45-53.
197. State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 270, 689 P.2d 519, 529 (1984) (Cameron, J., concurring).
198. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 10 (1963). The report is often called The Allen
Report, after the Chairman of the Committee, Professor Francis A. Allen.
199. Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 270, 689 P.2d at 529 (Cameron, J., concurring).
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As a judge, Thomas Cooley did not have much search and seizure
business, but as a commentator, he once said of the fourth amendment
that "it is better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished than that
the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his trunks
broken up, [or] his private books, papers, and letters exposed to prying
curiosity. ' 200 Why is this view any less valid when one's premises
have been invaded or one's constitutional rights otherwise violated?
Justice Cameron is not impressed with all this talk about it being
"better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished. . . ." Indeed, he
maintains that the release of one dangerous criminal is too great a
price for society to pay. 20' This is perhaps a plausible point of view.
But it is surely not the premise of the fourth amendment:
The inevitable result of the Constitution's prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures and its requirement that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause is that police officers who obey its strictures will
catch fewer criminals.... [T]hat is the price the framers anticipated and
were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity of the person, the home, and
property against unrestrained governmental power.20 2
Next to an outright abolition of the exclusionary rule there could
be nothing worse (or better, depending upon one's viewpoint) than a
"serious crimes" exception to the rule or "comparative reprehensibil-
ity" balancing in applying the rule. It is frustrating to see an "appar-
ently guilty" dangerous criminal go unpunished because the police
have violated his rights. It is tempting to argue that the need to en-
force the criminal law should justify a search that turned up damning
evidence. But it is worth recalling that "Jeremiah Gridley, the attor-
ney general of Massachusetts Bay Colony who represented the cus-
toms officers, argued that writs of assistance were justified by their
necessity in enforcing the customs laws."'20 3
"The Bill of Rights in general and the fourth amendment in partic-
ular ... deny to government - worse yet, to democratic government
- desired means, efficient means, and means that must inevitably ap-
pear from time to time throughout the course of centuries to be the
absolutely necessary means, for government to obtain legitimate and
laudable objectives. ' '2 0 4 And they deny these means to government
200. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 306 (1st ed. 1868).
201. See Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 132.
202. Stewart, supra note 128, at 1393 (quoted in Leon, 468 U.S. at 941-42 n.8 (Brennan and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting)).
203. Wasserstrom, supra note 133, at 317 n.282 (referring to N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 58
(1937)).
204. Amstersdam, supra note 131, at 353.
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whether their agents are pursuing petty criminals or especially danger-
ous ones. If the fourth amendment does not embody the judgment
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects" against unlawful searches and seizures outweighs
society's interest in apprehending and convicting as many criminals as
possible, criminals of whatever variety, then what does the amendment
mean?
So long as the exclusionary rule continues to be the only presently
available effective sanction or counterweight against unconstitutional
searches or seizures,205 Justice Cameron's proposal would, in effect,
make the fourth amendment read as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated
except when the police are investigating espionage, murder, kidnapping,
rape, arson, armed robbery, and other serious crimes - in which event
this Amendment does not apply.
Or-
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.
Despite the foregoing, however, when an officer of the law is pursuing mur-
derers, kidnappers, armed robbers, or other dangerous criminals, he or she
may violate the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Moreover, when in cases of nonserious crimes the
gravity of the crime outweighs the gravity of the officer's failure to follow
prescribed standards, he or she may also violate the right of the people to
be secure against unreasonable searches or seizures.
I may be doing Justice Cameron an injustice. Nowhere in his con-
curring opinion in the Bolt case, where he sets forth his criticism of the
exclusionary rule and his proposals for change, does he discuss the
need to develop or to strengthen alternative remedies. But in his more
extensive treatment of the same general subject - in the course of
discussing the desirability of abolishing the exclusionary rule entirely
- Justice Cameron does talk about the need, both as a matter of pol-
icy and constitutional law, to "develop" or to "implement" alternative
remedies.206 It is far from clear (to me, at any rate) that Justice Cam-
205. See text at notes 141-50 supra. Even Justice Cameron appears to concede that no viable
alternative to the exclusionary rule presently exists. See note 206 infra.
206. See Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 152-59. Justice Cameron observes that
although the Court once described the exclusionary rule as "constitutionally necessary" and "an
essential ingredient of the right," Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 656, a majority of the present Court
no longer views the rule this way; it now appears that "although some effective remedy is consti-
tutionally required, no particular remedy is mandated," Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at
157 (emphasis in original). I have to agree. See Kamisar, supra note 151, at 161-68. See also
Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1030; Stewart, supra note 128, at 1383-85, 1389. But see Schlag, supra
note 148, at 886-91.
Justice Cameron seems to concede that no effective alternative to the exclusionary rule pres-
ently exists. Thus he comments: "If effective alternative remedies are introduced to control po-
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eron believes that the development of an effective tort remedy or some
other viable alternative to the exclusionary rule should, or must, go
hand in hand with a "serious crimes" exception or a general "compar-
ative reprehensibility" approach to the rule. However, he may mean
that and for the rest of the discussion I shall assume that he does.
If as Justice Cameron informs us, "[t]he deterrence obtained by the
[exclusionary] rule is indirect and weak, and better obtained by more
direct methods";20 7 and if, as he assures us, "all of the suggested direct
alternative remedies are likely to produce a more reliable deterrent
effect on police behaviour than does the exclusionary rule"; 208 and if
he intends at least one of these more effective direct alternatives to the
exclusionary rule to accompany his proposed revision of the rule; what
would be accomplished by establishing a "serious crimes" exception to
the rule or otherwise narrowing its thrust?
We would not know the names of the hoodlums who skipped out
of jail on the basis of a fourth amendment violation because they
would not be jailed on the basis of such violations. 20 9 We would not
know precisely what evidence the police wrongfully acquired because
they would not have obtained evidence in violation of constitutional
rights.210 In short, an effective "direct alternative remedy" would not
"rub our noses" in the fourth amendment the way the exclusionary
rule does.211 And perhaps we would start talking about the costs of the
direct remedy or, better yet, the costs of the fourth amendment, rather
than the costs of the exclusionary rule. But beyond that, what would
really change?
A society whose officials obey the fourth amendment in the first
place (because of an effective tort or other "direct alternative" remedy)
"pays the same 'price' " as the society whose officials cannot use the
lice behavior," Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 152 (emphasis added); "[a] number of viable
alternatives have been suggested in recent years," id. (emphasis added); "direct remedies should
be developed for protecting the Fourth Amendment rights," id. at 154 (emphasis added); "it is
further recommended that state and federal legislatures develop direct alternatives for controlling
police behavior," id. at 159 (emphasis added); "[w]hen substitute remedies are finally imple-
inented ... [the exclusionary rule] can finally be abolished," id. (emphasis added).
207. Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 159.
208. Id. at 158.
209. Cf Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 592, 609-10 (1985).
210. Cf Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1037-38.
211. See id.:
[The exclusionary rule] flaunts before us the costs we must pay for fourth amendment guar-
antees. Of course, the command of the fourth amendment itself contemplates less than
complete efficiency in criminal law enforcement. The problem is that the exclusionary rule
rubs our noses in it .... Where guarantees of individual rights are actually obeyed by the
police, criminals are not discovered and thus no shocking cases come to public
consciousness.
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evidence they acquired because they obtained it in violation of the
fourth amendment. Both societies convict fewer criminals.
If a society relies on the exclusionary rule to enforce the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure, the convictions of some
"guilty" defendants will indeed be overturned (or never realized). But
if a society relies on an equally effective alternative means of enforcing
the guarantee, then " 'guilty' defendants will not be set free - but
only because they will not be arrested [or searched unlawfully] in the
first place."'212
Justice Cameron maintains that "where the criminal conduct in-
volved is more dangerous to society than the police misconduct, it
does not make sense to sacrifice the criminal prosecution in order to
deter the police. ' 213 But in the world Justice Cameron contemplates
(if, as I am assuming, a robust "direct alternative remedy" would ac-
company the severe restrictions on the exclusionary rule he proposes),
the criminal prosecution would still be "sacrificed" because the police
would be deterred from engaging in the misconduct necessary to
gather evidence for the prosecution. The accused would not be "let
off" even though he has suffered less from the police illegality commit-
ted against him than his purported victims have suffered from the
crime(s) he has perpetrated against them. 214 But he would not be "the
accused," because the police illegality would not have been committed
against him. The murderer would not "go free" because the privacy of
the home has been infringed.215 But he would remain free because the
police would not have infringed the privacy of the home.
Few commentators, if any, have criticized the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule more harshly than Dean Wigmore:
[T]he forces of criminality, fraud, anarchy, and law-evasion perceived
the advantage [of the rule] and made vigorous use of it.... [T]he judi-
cial excesses of many Courts in sanctioning its use give an impression of
maudlin complaisance which would be ludicrous if it were not so danger-
ous to the general respect for law and order in the community.
•.. For the sake of indirectly and contingently protecting the Fourth
Amendment, a Court appears indifferent to what is the direct and imme-
diate result, viz., of making Justice inefficient, and of coddling the crimi-
212. Tribe, supra note 209, at 609.
213. Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 5, at 142.
214. See id. at 151.
215. See id. at 154.
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nal classes of the population.2 16
Wigmore urged abolition of the rule, but, as successor critics of the
rule were to do, he offered alternatives: "both a civil action by the
citizen thus disturbed and a process of criminal contempt against the
offending officials" - "contempt of the Constitution," he called it.217
"The natural way to do justice," he maintained, "would be to enforce
the splendid and healthy principle of the Fourth Amendment directly,
i.e., by sending for the high-handed, over-zealous marshal who had
searched without a warrant, imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for
his contempt of the Constitution, and then proceeding to affirm the
sentence of the convicted criminal. ' 218
It is worth recalling what one who had the temerity to reply to
Wigmore's famous criticism of the exclusionary rule had to say about
the rule and its alternatives:
When it is proposed to secure the citizen his constitutional rights by the
direct punishment of the violating officer, we must assume that the pro-
poser is honest, and that he would have such consistent prosecution and
such heavy punishment of the offending officer as would cause violations
to cease and thus put a stop to the seizure of papers and other tangible
evidence through unlawful search.
If this, then, is to be the result, no evidence in any appreciable
number of cases would be obtained through unlawful searches, and the
result would be the same, so far as the conviction of criminals goes, as if
the constitutional right was enforced by a return of the evidence.
Then why such anger in celestial breasts? Justice can be rendered
inefficient and the criminal classes coddled by the [exclusionary rule]
only upon the assumption that the officer will not be directly punished,
but that the court will receive the fruits of his lawful acts, will do no
more than denounce and threaten him with jail or the penitentiary and,
at the same time, with its tongue in its cheek, give him to understand
how fearful a thing it is to violate the Constitution. This has been the
result previous to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court, and that is
what the courts are asked to continue.
* * * If punishment of the officer is effective to prevent unlawful
searches, then equally by this is justice rendered inefficient and criminals
coddled. It is only by violations that the great god Efficiency can
thrive.2 19
216. Wigmore, supra note 10, at 480-82. See also text at note 10 supra.
217. Wigmore, supra note 10, at 481, 484.
218. Id. at 484.
219. C. Hall, Evidence and the Fourth Amendrnent, 8 A.B.A. J. 646 (1922). Of course, if one
believes that "[t]he basic political problem of a free society is the problem of controlling the
public monopoly on force," Paulsen, supra note 164, at 265, then the exclusionary rule does not
impair "police efficiency" but furthers it.
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Connor Hall wrote that sixty-five years ago. 220 Perhaps Cardozo
was right - to what has been written about the exclusionary rule "lit-
tle of value can be added. ' 221 But so much has been written about the
exclusionary rule that it may be useful to recall what has been written
that is of value.
220. Hall's response to Wigmore appeared in a section of the A.B.A. Journal called "Letters
of Interest to the Profession." Evidently an editor of the Journal gave Hall's letter its title.
221. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
